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ABSTRACT
The focus of this dissertation is an examination of the
performance of the World Bank's Sites and Services approach to
low-income shelter in light of a current policy shift away
from these projects.
Presently, within the World Bank there is a movement to
abandon the sites and services approach and replace it with a
broader urban lending strategy commonly referred to as "urban
management" addressing the productive aspects of the city.
Unlike the previous lending for sites and services projects,
the new style urban management lending in no direct sense
produces low-cost shelter, nor does it target the poor.
From an examination of specific sites and services
project experience in Nairobi, Kenya, this movement towards
urban management is shown to be logical, representing a
positive learning path within donor agencies. Therefore urban
management is an appropriate policy strategy in complement
with sites and services. However, this shift towards urban
management is found to be part of a larger trend within the
World Bank which is signalling an abandonment of sites and
services, together with other poverty targetted lending in
general.
This study traces the rise and fall of sites and services
at the World Bank. A pattern is demonstrated in which new
ideas are latched onto, promoted and abandoned at a great rate
of speed as a result of organizational pressures to do so.
By tracking the "life of an idea," the study addresses a
general tendency in policy evolution to assume a "shift and
abandon" pattern. It is argued that the lure of new ideas, for
reasons of the optimism they engender and the opportunities
they carry, creates a momentum and often causes an arbitrary
abandonment of policies which remain sound. In the field of
Third World development, a high degree of continuity in policy
solutions applied to long-standing problems is critical to a
successful development strategy. This study concludes that an
independent path in international development policy must
evolve, free of this oscillation in the "life of ideas."
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Lisa R. Peattie
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
1.1
A movement began in the 1950s based on the principle of
self-help as a solution to the housing problem for the urban
poor of developing countries. By 1972, an idea whose time had
come, emerged in the form of "sites and services." (1) Buoyed
by the World Bank's President, Robert McNamara, who called for
the re-focussing of international development assistance on
poverty alleviation, the idea of sites and services swept the
international agencies, resulting in a flurry of project
undertakings.
By 1982, a decade later, after significant experience in
implementing sites and services projects, the idea began
losing credibility. Currently within the World Bank and other
development agencies, there is a movement to abandon the sites
and services approach and to replace it with a broader urban
lending strategy commonly referred to as "urban management."
1 The simplest definition of sites and services is the
laying out of a site of land and surveying of individual
household plots for servicing. The superstructure or house,
rooms, etc. are left to the plot owner to build. There are a
variety of options within sites and services ranging from a
surveyed plot, a plot with fully installed services, to a plot
with a "core" or liveable room onto which the plotholder is
expected to build the completed house. In some cases, there
may be a provision of building materials with each plot, in
others, kitchen and "splash" building cores are already built
on each plot at the time of purchase. Sites and services, as
referred to in this study, will be used in terms of this
broadest range of plot options.
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(2) This is quite an about-face. Unlike the previous lending
for sites and services projects, the new style urban
management lending in no direct sense produces low-cost
shelter, nor does it target the poor.
The study which follows is the result of my efforts to:
1/ investigate what happened in that decade of sites and
services project implementation which has rendered an
otherwise good idea, seemingly ineffectual; and,
2/ understand this dramatic swing in the international
development community.
Gaining insight into the first issue, only in part, informs
the second. It is my belief that other forces were operative
which explain this swing rather than a simple reaction to so-
called "negative" project experience. Identification of these
other forces has led to an exploration of what I call the
"life of ideas."
2 By urban management is meant essentially, managing
urban growth and ensuring productivity of the urban economy.
Although the Bank staff stated that as yet they were unclear
as to what components would be included in an urban management
loan package, the overall approach is clear. Urban management
addresses the administrative capacity of local government
institutions. A list of tasks that the World Bank identifies
under urban management policy includes: land management; cost
recovery; public sector training and personnel performance;
housing finance and public and private sector housing
financial institutions; infrastructure costs and fees and
charges for services; property tax assessments and management
of tax collections; and, local government budget systems and
management. Most of these items are discussed in terms of
increasing public sector efficiencies at the urban level. The
World Bank's most recent loans have a strong focus on what is
being termed "sectoral adjustment and reform" as opposed to
project by project lending.
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To begin this exploration, I trace the rise and fall of
sites and services at the World Bank, and demonstrate a
pattern in which new ideas such as this one, are latched ontoj
promoted and then abandoned at a great rate of speed as a
result of organizational pressures to do so. I argue that
organizational judgments of the fate of these ideas often have
more to do with the dynamics of the internal workings of donor
agencies than with the substantive merits of an idea vis-a-vis
the context of its' application in a developing area.
In this respect, I believe that the current movement to
abandon sites and services project lending is unwarranted.
Criticisms of the projects are valid but their successes are
also impressive and are recognized in this study and by many
World Bank evaluators. Although the momentum of the shift to
urban management is very strong, and commanding, in my
estimation the question is still open within the Bank as to
whether sites and services should be abandoned or be
maintained as a complementary policy to the newly evolving
urban management lending strategy. This is despite a more
external, public promotion by the Bank of the shift to urban
management in terms which signal a downplaying, even
abandonment of the sites and services approach. The debate on
the future of sites and services both within and outside the
Bank is a subtle one. While the flag of urban management has
gone up internationally signalling the Bank's new direction,
the jury is still out on the fate of sites and services inside
15
the Bank. In the following, I should like to address this
debate in support of a continuation of sites and serviges
lending.
I will argue that the movement towards urban manggement
is completely logical. Indeed it is being advocated b~y many
of the pioneers of sites and services at the Bank on the basis
of their project experience. In this way, urban management
can also be regarded as a means to help overcome some of the
problems with sites and services in the future.
However, the shift towards urban management has also been
used to further the more conservative swing being felt
internationally, away from issues of poverty towards
efficiency and growth. This seeming duality of opinions
within the Bank is being picked up by a similar duality found
in developing country governments.
What should be a building of the sites and servicges
experience in complement with the needed urban managerment
strategy is now being turned into an either-or debatew The
debate of ideas is becoming the agent for pushing deepter
ideological positions. Inside this phenomenon I am calling
the "life of ideas" I argue that, even those ideas based on
the best of intentions, can be seized upon and used as
weapons. (3)
3 From a discussion on the use of ideas with Lisa Peattie
at M.I.T.
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The adoption of an urban management strategy must be seen
as positive learning after a decade of project experience with
the sites and services approach. The criticisms of sites and
services must be interpreted not as unsolvable problems but
rather as a set of positive lessons. My position is to argue
that learning from past mistakes should not mean "learning not
to do." The idea of sites and services is still valid, and
workable. It is only within the Bank's and other donor
agencies' lending frameworks for these projects, that the idea
seems to have lost its power.
1.2 BACKGROUND
My position relative to the sites and services movement
has evolved from exposure on two fronts: first, through the
study of World Bank and United States Agency for International
Development (USAID) sites and services projects via project
appraisal and evaluation reports and interviews with these
agencies' project and policy staff; and, secondly, through
field observation during a one-year period of residence in
Nairobi, Kenya, in 1983 to 1984. There, the World Bank's
Dandora sites and services project was nearing completion, andP
a second World Bank financed sites and services project,
Kayole, was beginning. In addition, USAID had completed Phaset1
17
I of Umoja, a core housing project (4) and was in the process
of gaining approvals for Phase II.
At the outset of this study in 1982, I was aware of the
criticisms being levelled at sites and services both by agency
staff and others interested in the field. I agreed with these
evaluations and I myself had become critical of the approach
after a preliminary reading of the early findings of sites and
services projects. At a more abstract level however, I was
appreciative of the positive attributes of these projects as
well. Here was a good idea, advocated and funded by
international donors not previously interested in low-income
shelter, being implemented by governments who had, in the
past, demonstrated little interest in helping the poor with
affordable housing except through a very limited number of
public housing units. Despite the well-known problems, the
fact that these sites and services projects were undertaken at
all by reluctant governments and were financed by previously
disinterested donors, was significant.
More importantly, in the formulation of my position, I
observed and studied the building of a new, 48,000 person
housing community (the Dandora sites and services project in
4 Although USAID and the World Bank distinguish their
project lending in the shelter sector by name (the World Bank
lends for "sites and services" while USAID lends for "core
housing"), in principle the approach is the same. USAID's
core housing, in supplying a core room onto which the rest of
the house is to be added, is a sites and services option often
seen on World Bank financed projects as well. The options are
varied as described in the previous note (1).
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Nairobi) offering alternatives to a city where one-third of
the population lived in acutely overcrowded and underserviced
squatter settlements.
In contrast to what I had read about the positive
movements of self-help in the squatter settlements in Lima,
Rio de Janeiro and other Latin American cities (5) many of
Nairobi's informal settlements were less inspiring. The
largest settlement known as Mathare Valley was controlled by
"companies" which charged high rents for accommodations
characterized by densities of 3333 persons per hectare, (6)
inadequate sanitary services, a high incidence of malaria, and
a climate of insecurity and violence. Despite my previously
held view of squatter settlements as a positive phenomena,
what I saw, seemed to corroborate what had been described in
the development literature as the "old view" which depicted
squatter settlements not as a "solution" but rather as disease
and crime-ridden slums.
5 The more positive view of squatter settlements can be
traced back to the early work of people like John Turner
(1965), William Mangin (1967), and Elizabeth and Anthony Leeds
(1970). See also Mangin and Turner (1968). Charles S. Stokes
(1962) also differentiated between the "slums of despair" in
the United States and the "slums of hope" in the developing
countries. Although armed with this more optimistic
viewpoint, the Mathare Valley squatter settlement in Nairobi,
as a result of the tyranny of the "companies," offered no such
advantages as the flexible, self-improving communities being
described in this literature on Latin America.
6 David Etherton, Mathare Valley: A CaseStudyof
Uncontrolled Settlement in Nairobi (1976). This density in
Mathare Valley is measured against a legal standard called for
by the Nairobi City Council of 290 to 400 people per hectare.
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Against the backdrop of these conditions, and compounded
by a crippled municipal government, (7) the Dandora sites and
services project seemed a remarkable achievement. The project
demonstrated that it was indeed possible to provide affordable
housing of relative high quality with water and sanitary
services to low and moderate income residents. I was
impressed to see government bureaucrats located in site
offices for sites and services projects, actively assisting
households with their shelter problems. Plotholders were
building rooms and additions at a rapid pace. The more
entrepreneurial households had begun to rent rooms and were
greatly augmenting their monthly incomes. The project
represented a real movement forward in the city.
The problems enumerated in the Bank evaluations of
Dandora and other sites and services projects were also
evident, such as costly delays, a poor cost-recovery record,
slow-moving and inadequate public institutions, and
7 In 1983, in response to a long history of corruption
and internal fighting in the Nairobi City Council, President
Moi suspended the existing elected council, the mayor, as well
as all chief officers including the town clerk. The
Government of Kenya (GOK) replaced the Council with an interim
committee of appointed officials. The infighting which had
resulted in the virtual stalemate and inability of the elected
council to function in its municipal roles was partially
attributed to a scandal involving bribery charges and the
misallocation of sites and services plots in the Umoja I and
Dandora projects funded by USAID and the World Bank
respectively. During the long period of transfer of
responsibility, the activities of municipal government came to
a virtual standstill. More detail on this political upheaval
and its relation to the housing scene in Nairobi is included
in Chapter 5 and Appendix A.
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obstreperous local officials. In the eyes of the project
formulators, these problems were acutely frustrating.
However, I saw evidence of networks of community
organizations starting to adapt their own response to some of
the shortcomings of the project. For example, relief funds
for allottees experiencing financial difficulty, were being
provided by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as the
National Christian Council of Kenya, and the Ford Foundation.
It seemed not unreasonable to expect that given time,
experience and the strengthening of local government
institutions, many of these problems could be resolved. Could
it be that the Bank staff were hoping for too much too soon?
Subsequent to this field exposure and in light of the
differing assessments of sites and services projects I asked
the question:
Against what criteria are sites and services projects being
judged and do the perceived failures. warrant that the approach
be deemed ineffective?
In the process of attempting to answer this question, I
found that many of the failures could be seen in two ways:
(1) that "failures" were often a direct result of conditions
for the projects which the Bank set in order to satisfy
21
criteria internal to its operations but not inherent in the
sites and services idea; and,
(2) the perception of project failures often reflected a set
of the Bank's own expectations which were unrealistically
ambitious and/or rigid within the context of evolving
institutions in developing countries and a limited time-frame
in which the projects were executed.
These findings indicated that another level of analysis
was needed beyond the Bank's project experience to explain the
dramatic shift in its urban lending strategy, away from sites
and services. What else was going on in the World Bank in
Washington that was directing this shift in its urban lending
policy?
To answer this required moving from project specific
investigations to an inquiry of what the Bank was saying at
the level of general policy. The tone of the rhetoric in
Washington was even stronger in its rejection of the sites and
services approach than in the official evaluations and
reviews. An event which I witnessed there encapsulated this
mood.
During a session at the World Bank's Conference on Urban
Assistance in December, 1985, a delegation of developing
country government officials were being lectured to by a World
Bank official about their respective governments' incapacity
22
to successfully undertake housing projects. The Bank official
enumerated a long list of deficiencies and bottlenecks making
reference to inadequate registration of land, poorly
functioning land markets, inefficient administrative
capacities, over-subsidized housing programs, mismanagement of
taxation and generally unproductive urban economies that were
harmful to national economic development. The implication of
this lecture was that these government officials who could not
properly manage their municipal administrations had no
business undertaking housing projects. Therefore, the Bank's
future efforts (and money) would concentrate on strengthening
urban management.
In response to this statement on the Bank's position, a
government housing official from one of the Sub-Saharan
African countries delivered the following statement:
"We have just accepted sites and services after fifteen
years of you, the Bank, promoting the idea in my
country. And now you tell us to abandon it. Well, we
like the idea. Now we want to do sites and services
and you tell us we should do urban management."
This event corroborated my impression that the abruptness
of the shift in policy was indeed sudden. However, what
became an even greater concern was to witness the
extraordinary momentum with which the Bank's new direction
created a bandwagon effect amongst the government officials in
attendance. My outspoken African friend was evidently
23
outnumbered by the delegates who seemed anxious to entertain
the Bank's latest interest.
What seemed wrong in all of this was that even if the
Bank's intentions were to advocate urban management as a
complementary policy to sites and services, (8) in fact the
new policy was being promoted at the expense of the old,
leaving the impression that the sites and services approach
was being replaced. It was not apparent to me that the Bank
realized it was doing this, but the fallout from this approach
I estimated would be fourfold:
first, any continuum of experience fundamental to local
institution building would be lost by the shift away from
practical implementation;
8 Indeed official statements by both Bank
representatives and government delegates at the Urban
Assistance Conference were careful to avoid a direct rejection
of sites and services, but the following quotations (as cited
in UrbanEdge, February, 1986) demonstrate how the tide had
turned:
"We are not talking about the business of executing some
projects, we are talking about relating urban management to
economic development, about the process of ensuring that a
city performs better." - K.C. Sivaramakrishnan,
Director of the Central Ganga
Authority in New Delhi
"The difficulties that lie ahead will require urban decision
makers to look beyond the requirements of an individual sites
and services scheme ... and come to grips with the task of
managing cities." - S. Shahid Husain, Vice
President for Operations Policy
at the World Bank
"I am not mayor of shanty towns - I am mayor of Dakar."
- Mayor Mamadou Diop, Dakar
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second, it would break the momentum of an important policy
movement in the shelter sector that developing country
governments were just beginning to feel comfortable with;
third, the depth of experience which the Bank's Urban staff
had accumulated from their decade of work on sites and
services would be marginalized, representing lost learning,
hence lost opportunities; and,
fourth, under the guise of technical fine-tuning, a more
fundamental policy shift would be introduced. The policy
orientation of sites and services towards development with
equity could surreptitiously be ignored with the introduction
of a new policy orientation towards urban productivity. It
was back to trickle-down.
In addition to my specific concerns with the sites and
services movement, my inquiry was also driven by a belief that
development assistance in general was in difficulty. The
formulation, implementation and subsequent abandonment of
development policy seemed to be too closely linked to
international ideological swings, the immediate performance
needs of donor agencies, and the demands of bureaucratic and
organizational contexts. The rapid pace of changing ideas and
policies coming from the donor agencies was completely out of
synchronization with the recipient governments' slower moving
development process. All of this served poorly the task of
development and the needs of developing countries.
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In attempting to find an explanation for these movements
in policy which seem to be disengaged from the actual best
interests of development, I began to explore the theory that
in some instances change in policy might well be for change's
sake. My meaning here is that change can be an agent for: 1/
optimism in an uncertain field; and 2/ personal career
advancement in an environment where new sounding approaches
are rewarded more than patient commitment to old ones,
irrespective of their worth.
This is not meant to characterize all those working in
the field of development assistance as less than well-
intentioned, but the force of new ideas has a multiplier
effect creating an enormous momentum in which even the most
independent people are caught up. New ideas tend to sweep a
field, often brushing aside the value of approaches once held
in good currency. The analogy I use to characterize the
movement of ideas is a lifecycle, implying that with every
birth, there is inevitable death. This I term the "life of
ideas."
My intention in this study is to suggest that a more
perceptive approach is needed, especially in the development
field where the time needed to make significant improvements
in the conditions of impoverished nations is extensive. The
context of policy formulations must somehow extract itself
from the lure of change as an end in itself. I will argue
that the evolution of policy according to what I term a "shift
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and abandon" pattern is both inefficient, and costly for both
the international donors and developing country governments.
1.3 Dandcra: A Case Study
In light of the criticisms being directed at the sites
and services approach, I felt it was necessary, in formulating
my argument, to review a specific case study of a sites and
services project from the project appraisal stage to its final
outcome. For this purpose, I have used the World Bank's
Dandora Project which was completed in 1983.
From my review of 16 sites and services projects, I felt
that Dandora was, in its objectives and overall design,
representative of the majority of projects which the Bank
funded. The field reality in which the project was executed,
characterized by a variety of opportunities and constraints,
was also consistent with other projects.
Dandora, as with other projects, was considered by the
Bank to have a mixture of successes and failures. Indeed,
Dandora suffered serious cost escalations and a delay of 2 1/2
years. It was also executed in an atmosphere of extreme
skepticism and political interference.
It would therefore be unfair to depict my evaluation of
the successes of the Dandora project as the product of looking
at a particularly *good' example.
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Within this paper then, my evaluation of Dandora
hopefully serves as the objective core around which my
argument is formed. However, I do make reference to other
projects throughout the text when they serve to contrast or
corroborate a finding in the Dandora project.
1.4 Structure of the Argument
I begin my discussion in Chapter 2 with a brief history
of the rise of the sites and services idea and its subsequent
adoption by the World Bank and other international lending
agencies. This is followed by a factual description of the
basic programmatic elements of the Dandora project in Chapter$7
3. Chapters 4 and 5 provide an in-depth evaluation of the
Dandora project through a comparative analysis of project
objectives and outcomes. These outcomes are presented in the
context of the realities of the field and the realities of the
Bank as the agent for the sites and services model. Chapter 5
concludes with a summary of perceived failures and successes
of the Dandora project.
In addition, Chapters 4 and 5 explain the extensive
problems encountered in project implementation and illustrate
how the need for urban management was a logical outcome of the
sites and services experience.
Chapter 6 is divided into two main sections. The first
section examines the rise of the urban management idea as a
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policy which complements sites and services lending. The
second section goes on to describe why the rise of urban
management is occurring at the expense of sites and services.
In this chapter I attempt to provide an explanation for why
the Bank seemed to latch onto the urban management idea and
simultaneously abandon sites and services. The accumulation
of events and forces both internal and external to the Bank I
then factor into a theory on "the life of ideas".
In the final section (Chapter 7) I set forth my arguments
for the continuation of lending targeted at poverty
alleviation and for sites and services projects in particular,
while recognizing the validity of lending for urban
manaqement.
I conclude by examining the role which the "life of
ideas" seems to play in the larger realm of policy
formulation, calling attention to: (1) the need for a better
understanding of how policy shifts affect developing nations;
and, (2) the importance of a process of policy making which
can operate beyond the arbitrary and eternal cycle of ideas.
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2.0 THERISEOFTHE IDEAOFSITESANDSERVICES
2.1 Introduction
The rise of the idea of sites and services began in the
1950's and had "caught on" by 1970. A brief history of its
evolution offers insight into why sites and services became
such a potent idea internationally, and how it gained popular
support in the international development community amongst
professionals and scholars alike.
2.2 Background
The search for new ideas began in the 1950's when housing
for the poor of Third World cities was identified by scholars
and professionals in the development field as an area
requiring international attention and assistance. A number of
circumstances led to this international call for development
initiatives in the shelter field.
Many cities in developing countries were experiencing a
severe crisis related to high rates of urban migration and
general population growth levels. In Nairobi, for instance,
the population increase between the years 1962 and 1969 was
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estimated at 5.5% annually, or a 50% increase in 7 years. (1)
Three-quarters of this growth was attributed to migration from
rural areas to the capital.
Due to extreme conditions of poverty in rural areas, the
influx of the rural poor created no "effective" (2) market
demand for housing. Consequently, the private developers did
not respond by building new housing for recent migrants. The
lack of supply was compounded by a slow-moving development
process which resulted from bottlenecks in the registration,
surveying and servicing of lands through the existing
municipal administrations. For the few private developers who
were willing to build low-rent housing, the process of
approvals was so slow-moving that very few persevered.
In 1974, the number of housing units being built annually
in Nairobi by the private sector was estimated at 1,000.(3)
This figure was minimal compared to the annual addition of
9,000 households per year to the city. The new units that
1 Nairobi City Council Urbanization Task Force,
Dadora-_Community-Development Project, Project Submission to
IBRD, November 1973.
2 William C. Wheaton and Philippe Annez, "Economic
Development and the Housing Sector: A Cross-National Model",
Economic DevelopmentandCulturalChange, Vol. 32 No. 4, July,
1984, p.749-766. Here the distinction between an "effective"
market demand versus a housing "need" is made.
3 Op.Cit., Nairobi City Council Urbanization Task Force
(1973)
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were built were almost exclusively available to the middle and
higher income population.
Amongst local politicians and established citizens alike,
there was also a resistance to acknowledge the need for low-
cost housing. This resistance was based on a fear of growing
slums in their cities, which would not only threaten property
values but would reflect badly on their "visions" of a modern
metropolis. Especially in nations which recently attained
independence, the symbolic significance of the city and
especially the capital city as the embodiment of national
pride should not be underestimated as a factor influencing
housing policy today.
In addition, there was a belief among policy-makers that
to support housing for the poor would only encourage on-going
migration. If no housing was provided, the rural migrants
would eventually go back home. Public sector housing policy
during the late 1960's and early 1970's was consequently
geared to middle and upper income levels. In this period it
was estimated that publicly constructed units averaged 1,30C)
per year.(4) Between what the public and private sector was
supplying, and the rates of growth in Nairobi, the shortfall
was at least 6,700 units per year.
The problem of a shortfall in units did not go away.
Instead of moving back to rural areas, the new urbanites did
4 Bank Files, Kenya - Transportation and Urban Projects
Department, 1977
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what they had to in order to maintain an existence in the
city. This led to rapid proliferation of makeshift buildings
on lands not owned by the builders. Those who constructed the
units either lived in them or rented them out. Collectively,
they formed squatter settlements. To add to this uncontrolled
growth, some private land owners developed dwelling units on
their properties which violated health and building codes and
rented these units to the poor.
In many cities the government response to this informal
construction was to demolish illegal settlements where
possible. Thus, an on-going cycle of demolition and rebuilding
began. In Nairobi, as in many cities, continued demolition
led to an escalating atmosphere of confrontation and unrest
between the government and the urban poor. By 1974, the
squatter and illegal settlements population was conservatively
estimated at more than one third of the then 730,000
inhabitants.(5) The scale of these communities began to take
on political significance which elected officials could no
longer ignore.
Some degree of tolerance was demonstrated with the
implicit policy that illegal settlements would be tolerated if
they kept outside of the city centers - on the fringe of
established neighborhoods. This type of action did little to
solve the housing problem, however. A turning point came in
Nairobi, with an outbreak of cholera in the Mathare Valley
5 Ibid
squatter settlement which threatened the city with an
epidemic. The government finally accepted that something
would have to be done to improve conditions.
Efforts were made to upgrade squatter settlements by
providing basic services such as common water spigots and
latrines. Though conditions improved in these areas, the rate
of growth was so high that the government response still could
not keep pace with demands.
This ad hoc pattern of public response to illegal
settlements was repeated throughout the world. In many
countries such problems occurred decades earlier than the
Nairobi example. Few countries however, developed adequate
methods for dealing with the increasingly acute housing
problems.
2.3 AnEmergingIda
Proposals for new methods of meeting low income housing
demand were emerging as early as 1950 when a United Nations
"Mission of Experts" visited South/South-East Asia and
produced a report on "Housing in the Tropics"(6) which
stated:
"...with few exceptions, families in the tropics
simply cannot afford to buy or rent houses built for
6 U.N. Mission of Experts on Tropical Housing (South and
South East Asia, November-December 1950 and January 1951),
Report of the Secretary General (E/CN.5/251, 1 March, 1951)
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them on a commercial basis. It is also obvious that
neither governments, nor private agencies can
provide housing on a subsidized basis to all in
need. Practical solutions should combine the
initiative and resourcefulness of the people, the
rational application of local materials and skills,
the mutual advantages of group work, and the best
use of resources and technical knowledge available."
Charles Abrams, studying the shelter question in this
period, was instrumental in developing a self-help approach as
the most affordable route to housing the poor of developing
countries. Other studies took up Abrams' interest in self-
help as a means of solving the housing crisis. A study in
Latin America argued in support of self-help practices by
citing that in one country, the government had built 5,476
houses between 1949 and 1956 (which were unaffordable to the
average urban family). During that same period, 50,000
families solved their housing needs on their own initiative -
outside of the established legal, administrative and financial
superstructure.(7)
This new perception of the squatter movement as a
"solution" led to the advocacy of public programs based on
self-help practices observed in the squatter settlements.
Research conducted in the 1960's noted that once tenure was
secured by squatters, either in the legal sense or simply by
nature of the time of "safe" occupations preliminary make-
shift houses were gradually improved over time through self-
7 Turner, Turner and Crooke, 1963, p. 389
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help and changed into permanent, better-looking structures.(8)
This theory of "progressive development" held that the
incentive of secure tenure would lead to progressive
upgrading, and the emergence of stable, healthy neighborhoods
comprised of home-owners who held a "stake" in the future
success of their communities. More importantly, the
improvement of housing through self-help in the shanty towns
of the Third World was shown to be an affordable means of
gaining shelter for the very poor families with unsteady
incomes. The flexibility offered by this piecemeal system of
building allowed even the poorest to slowly develop better
housing for themselves.(9) The idea of sites and services
evolved out of this growing appreciation of the key principles
discovered in the squatter settlement "solution".
The basic tenets of the sites and services model as it
emerged in the international development community are
summarized below:
(1) Impr.ovement-overPublicHousinggSghegmes
8 William Mangin "Latin American Squatter Settlements: A
Problem and a Solution", Latin American Research Review, 1967,
pp.65-98 and John F.C. Turner, "Housing Priorities, Settlement
Patterns and Urban Development in Modernizing Countries",
Journal of the American Institute of Planners, Vol. XXXIV, No.
6 (November, 1968), pp. 354-363.
9 Lisa R. Peattie, "Social Aspects of Housing", in
Bernard J. Frieden and William W. Nash (eds.). Shaping_aD
UrbanFuture:_Essay _in Honor-ofCatherine BauerWurstein,
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1969)
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By not having to fund the construction of actual
units, governments are able to service more lots for
the money spent, hence reaching a greater number of
people in need on a public housing scheme.
(2) Affordability
The plot holder's unit cost is reduced by having to
buy only the lot and not the completed dwelling,
after which self-help construction will keep the
dwelling costs down. The financial commitment can
be regulated according to individual capacities.
Time, labor and money can be invested piecemeal into
the construction of the dwelling as appropriate.
(3) Standard ofServices
Sites and services projects ensure a uniform
provision of services, thus overcoming problems of
health and sanitation as experienced in squatter
settlements. Related to this, servicing can be done
before the fact unlike upgrading which is more
expensive since services have to be installed into
an existing, dense, non-grid pattern of dwellings.
(4) Self-Helpand_ErgEessive Development _of Shelter
Sites and services provide a framework for self-help
and the initiatives in housing being undertaken in
the squatter settlements with respect to the
progressive development of housing.
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(5) Tenure
Home Ownership offers secure and legal tenure to the
resident. The individual, by making a downpayment
for the lot in the sites and services project,
secures a legal right to live there.
(6) Order ly_UranGrowth
The larger objectives of planned and orderly urban
growth can be achieved by implementing sites and
services through central planning departments.
2.4 How theIdeaCaughtOn
Not only was the sites and services approach considered a
good policy solution in response to a perceived field reality,
but at the level of international policy, the time was ripe
for a new idea. Events were underway creating an environment
in which a new idea could gain currency quickly and
forcefully. The 1960's was a period of critical requestioning
in the international donor community, and the dominant growth
models came under attack. In the development literature,
impressive economic growth rates achieved in developing
countries were being questioned on the basis of worsening
forms of poverty within these same countries.
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In effect, this questioning and alert on poverty amidst
growth marked the failure of the trickle-down theory. Calls
for alleviation of poverty and demands for "growth with
equity" began to undermine the once dominant economic growth
models of the 1960's. The priority thus began to shift, at
least at the level of international rhetoric, to the
fulfillment of basic human needs or more generally,
alleviation of poverty.
Poverty alleviation signalled a higher profile for low
income housing. At the World Bank in 1973, (10) President
Robert McNamara called for the Bank's reorientation away from
its almost exclusive concern with basic economic
infrastructure toward antipoverty work. As a result, concern
with urban poverty led to a movement within the Bank to begin
lending for low-cost housing.(11)
As a result, a World Bank meeting was convened, attended
by a large number of experts in the field outside of the Bank,
including John Turner, and ideas of self-help and core housing
were reviewed. The meeting mapped out a course for financing
test projects in the field of housing which would be operated
10 In 1973, USAID also reoriented its development
assistance program towards the needs of the poor as a result
of the passage of the "New Directions" legislation, formerly
referred to as the 1973 Foreign Assistance Act. This
legislation marked a shift from development assistance
directed at basic infrastructure, capital-intensive, industry-
based growth to a concentration on poverty, malnutrition and
health, population and human resource development.
11 Robert L. Ayres, Bankingon thePoor, MIT Press,
Cambridge, 1983
4)
out of the Special Projects Unit. Subsequently, supported by
a panel of urban specialists outside the Bank, the sites and
services approach was proposed in the 1972 sector working
paper.(12) The Bank's urban lending program was launched -
with sites and services projects as its feature.
12 Michael Cohen, Learning_ByQDing, (Washington, D.C.:
The World Bank, 1983)
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3.0 MAKI NGTHEIDEA _PERTIONAL
3.1 Introduction
The "idea" of sites and services was taken up by the
World Bank and made operational via a process of project
appraisals in a number of countries during the early 1970s.
The time taken in formulating a sites and services project in
those days was long, because of inexperience on the part of
many developing countries as well as Bank staff with the
approach. A model had not been clearly worked out. For
example, in the case of the first Bank-assisted sites and
services project in Nairobi, Kenya, the first mention of a
shelter project in Bank files is February, 1969. The loan for
the project was approved in May, 1975. What happened in these
six years is a process divided into phases referred to in Bank
terms as "reconnaissance," "pre-identification,"
"identification," "preparation," "pre-appraisal," "government
application," "appraisal," "post-appraisal," "negotiation" and
"board approval," in that order.
The process is not only long, but characteristic of
intense back and forth debates on what is, for the Bank, a
fundable project, versus what is more for the government, a
buildable project. In effect, the concept of sites and
services was moving from the level of an idea to that of an
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implementable project. In the Kenya case, what emerged was a
project that met agreement with both parties and was developed
at the eastern end of Nairobi beginning in 1975. The resulting
community was named Dandora.
My review of the formulation of 16 Bank-assisted sites
and services projects (1) has revealed the development of a
general model. The sites and services projects certainly have
variations across countries but the basic formulation is the
same. The projects all offer a variety of plot options in
terms of plot size and level of core construction per plot; a
materials loan fund to assist the allottee to build rooms on
the plot; on-site community facilities; and water, sewage and
refuse services. The project loan usually includes a
technical assistance component. The Bank's project appraisal
charts out the time frame for implementation, the financing
agreement, cost estimates, affordability schedules and
expected monthly payments, the organization and management
system for project implementation, procurement and
disbursement schedules, cost recovery and pricing
arrangements, and finally, the economic justification for the
project.
1 The 16 sites and services project appraisal
documents reveal how the model became formulated in the Bank
assisted projects. The 16 project appraisals examined
include: Zambia, 1974; Kenya I 1974; Kenya II 1978; Nicaragua
1973; Guatemala 1976; Botswana 1974; Bolivia 1977; Tanzania
1974; Zimbabwe 1984; Korea 1974; Senegal 1972; Peru 1974; El
Salvador 1974; Nigeria 1981; Indonesia 1974; and Jamaica 1973.
The Dandora project is presented here as an example of
the result of the Bank's and a recipient country's efforts to
formulate an alternative model for shelter development.
Throughout this study, the Dandora project is drawn on as a
case study of a sites and services project. The Nairobi case
is significant for reason of a second Bank-financed sites and
services project in the city, Kayole, which followed Dandora.
This allows me to draw on both projects in the course of this
study and to evaluate instances where lessons and experience
were incorporated from one early project into a later one. A
brief description of the Dandora sites and services project is
detailed here so that the approach taken in the Bank assisted
projects and the programmatic elements can act as a basis for
the discussion and arguments which follow.
3.2. Dandora Sites andServicesProject_in NairobiKe@Iya (2)
3.2.1 The Context
At the time of appraisal in 1974, Nairobi had a
population of 730,000 and a growth rate of 7 percent, making
it one of the fastest growing cities in the world. Annual
"conventional" public and private sector housing production
was averaging 2,300 units compared to a household formation of
2 This project description is drawn from World Bank files
of the Dandora project in 1974.
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9,000 per year. The result was that over one-third of the
population was living in unauthorized settlements.
3.2.2 The Stated Goals of the Project
In the Bank's appraisal of the Dandora project, two goals
were stated:
(i) "While it will not satisfy the total demand for
serviced plots in Nairobi, the technical assistance under the
project will help formulate shelter programs designed to deal
realistically with the needs of the urban poor and enable
Government and Local Authorities to plan and execute such
projects in the future."
(ii) "Dandora will provide 6,000 self-help housing
units or 25 percent of the target for the City's Plan (1974-
78), and do this at one-third of the unit costs of previous
housing programs. "
3.2.3 Project Site
The Dandora Community is located 10 km east of the city
center and is accessible to employment. Transportation to the
downtown takes 25 minutes by bus, at a cost equal to 7 percent
of the targeted household's monthly income. Two industrial
areas are within walking distance at the Dandora and Ruaraka
industrial sites.
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3.2.4 Project Financing
The Dandora project cost at appraisal was $29.6 million
(US), to be financed as follows:
$14 million contributed from the World Bank and the
International Development Association (IDA)
(World Bank contribution = $7 million
IDA contribution = $7 million)
and $15.6 million contributed from the Government of
Kenya (GOK) and the Nairobi City Council (NCC)
The Government of Kenya acted as borrower, and on-lent
both $7 million IDA -t-and $7 million Bank loan to NCC at
8 percent interest for 25 years with a 4 year grace period.
GOK on-lent its share to NCC on the same terms as the National
Housing Corporation loans to Kenyan municipalities - at 6.5
percent for 25 years.
3.2.5 Sites and Services Project Components
(a) Lots
The project provided 6,000 lots with individual water and
sewer connections and related basic services and
infrastructure, including roads, security lighting and refuse
collection. The 6,000 lots included:
1,800 of 110 square meters
2,100 of 120 square meters
1,800 of 140 square meters
300 of 160 square meters
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Three options were available to allottees:
Option A:, 3,780 units with sanitary
core (toilet and
splash) only on lot sizes
110, 120 and 140 square
meters
Option B: 1,800 units with sanitary
core plus one room on lot
sites 110, 120 and 140
square meters
Option C: 300 units with sanitary core
plus two rooms on 160
square meter lots (plus 30
demonstration units).
There were, in effect, seven options in all, varying by
lot size and type of core unit.
(b) Materials Loans
A materials loan fund was established offering cash
financing for self-help construction of dwellings for up to
two rooms. The materials loan repayment terms were the same
as the mortgage.
(c) Community Facilities
As part of the Dandora community being created,
construction of the following community facilities was
planned:
2 nursery schools
6 primary schools
2 health centers
2 multi-purpose community centers
1 sports complex.
400 market stalls
48
(d) Trunk Infrastructure
Included in the project was construction of trunk sewers,
stabilization ponds, access roads and sewerage treatment
works.
3.2.6 Plot Allocation
Care was taken to ensure impartiality in the allocation
of lots. The Project Unit was to use a computerized random
number program (NCC had this computer facility). Each step in
the process was to be publicized. Both the list of eligible
applicants and the list of finally selected allottees together
with a waiting list was to be made public and posted as ready.
To be eligible for plot allocation, the following
criteria had to be met:
(i) household monthly income of Ksh 280 (US $40);
(ii) 2 year residency in Nairobi;
(iii) had to be head of family and family had to be
living in Nairobi; and,
(iv) could not own any other property in the city
(Kenya's one man, one house policy).
3.2.7 Affordability
Monthly charges for each plot were to range from Ksh 72
(US $10) to Ksh 150 (US $20). Assuming household expenditures
for shelter and services of 25 percent, Option "A" plots
(comprising 65 percent of the total) were to be affordable to
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households as low as the 20th income percentile and Option "B"
plots (comprising 30 percent of the total) to the 30th and
40th income percentile. Mortgage terms were 30 year repayment
periods on Option "A" and 20 year repayment periods on Option
"B" at 8 percent.
In addition, 300 plots of 160 square meters with built
wet-core and two rooms were to be sold at market rate (about
47 percent above construction cost). The profits generated
from the market sale plots were then to be channelled back
into the project, acting as a cross subsidy for the 100 sq. m.
and 120 sq. m. plots which were those considered most
appropriate for targetting the lowest income households. The
subsidy earned from 300 market sale plots would result in an
18 percent price reduction for 2,668 low cost plots.
3.2.8 Allocation of Costs Between Allottees and Nairobi City
Council
Nairobi City Council was to bear costs typically
recovered through utility tariffs, user fees and property
rates such as trunk infrastructure, on-site water
reticulation, paving of bus routes, community facilities
including related land development and servicing costs,
technical assistance and landscaping.
The plot holders were to bear the costs of site
preparation, lot demarcation (design and engineering) and on-
site infrastructure attributable to residential use (roads,
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sewerage, street lighting, and a share of refuse collection)
and full costs of core units and materials loans.
3.2.9 Time Frame
The Dandora project was to be executed over 5 years. Lot
preparation and servicing would require 3 1/2 years and
disbursement of building material loans and self-help
construction would require 1 1/2 years.
The project was to be built in two phases. The first
phase was to prepare and service 1000 lots and the second
phase, 5,000 lots. These two phases would be completed in the
first 3 1/2 years.
3.3 Summary
This programmatic description of the Dandora sites and
services project in Nairobi as appraised by the World Bank in
1974, is to act as a basis for the in-depth analysis of the
project objectives and outcomes in the two chapters which
follow.
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4.0 THE FORCESWHICHSH'EDTHE _ROJECTS
4.1 Introduction
As a methodology for evaluating the successes and
failures experienced when the sites and services concept was
put into practice, I attempt in the following to identify the
key objectives which guided the implementation of the
projects. As will be seen, some of these objectives were
"add-ons" and did not emanate from the core of the sites and
services idea itself. In these instances, the projects were
seen as a vehicle to assist in the realization of goals,
which, though related, had a broader, longer-lasting
significance. Additionally, project implementation was
affected by a set of objectives which were a result of
perceived pressures emanating from the field reality and from
the World Bank itself.
My intention here is to portray the scenario within which
project implementation staff were working - a dynamic rife
with crossed desires, mixed interests and built-in conflicts.
As an aside, my feeling is that, for the most part, the Bank
staff prevailed in keeping to the course they set-out upon.
Given the context within which they were working, their
successes are actually remarkable.
The structure of this and the following chapter is,
therefore, shaped so as to make a more objective link between
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1) objectives, motives and pressures, 2) the design of
specific project characteristics and 3) the final outcome.
After establishing the background in this chapter in terms of
the first two items, I will go on in Chapter 5 to discuss the
third. In adopting this structure, I hope to avoid an
oversimplified evaluation of the so-called "project failures"
of sites and services. I believe it is precisely this
tendency to oversimplify when evaluating the sites and
services record, which characterizes the judgment of those who
are quick to claim the sites and services movement as "over".
(1)
4.2 SevenFo.rces
Seven important forces may be said to have driven the
formulation of the sites and services projects. The first
set, which can also be thought of as objectives, are a product
of the original sites and services model. As outlined in
Chapter 2, the tenets of the model are numerous but each
1 This, in fact, was the verdict offered by the first
Bank staffer I talked to when I went to Washington
headquarters. His good intention was to save me from pursuing
an idea he considered already passe. A significant number of
the staff I interviewed concurred on this, although the
verdict was somewhat softened by their own loyalty to the
approach. Many of the interviews began with similar
statements, that they were not doing sites and services
anymore. Many did, however, state that, whenever possible,
they argued to ensure a sites and services component was added
in to an urban management loan.
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impacts the other in significant ways. To avoid an
overlapping discussion, I have attempted to deduce two
principle areas of concern which are distinct from one
another, but which collectively cover the full scope of the
original model. These are: Affordability; and HomeOwnership.
The second set of objectives originated with the World
Bank's broader ambition of seeing the sites and services
approach to low-income shelter replicate upon the initiative
of the developing counties. Integral to this was a desire to
improve the entire housing and urban management sector so that
replication of other projects could be realized. This
ambition I have distilled into three objectives:
Regplicability, Institution Building and Cost Recovery.
Because these Bank objectives are not inherent to the model as
a housing formula per se, I view them as a set of "add-on"
goals.
The final set identified are a bit harder to classify as
objectives. Rather I prefer to think of them as outside
forces operating completely independent of the original
conception of sites and services. These forces are the result
of pressures applied to the implementation of the projects by
the realities of the field (i.e. the entire context of working
in a particular developing nation) and the realities of
working within the World Bank. Because the Dandora and other
projects studied here were considered demonstration projects,
unusual demands were placed on the project staff which would
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normally be less intense (i.e. once the idea had been
accepted). These forces I have termed: Projegerance,
and The Need for _Speed.
4.3 Affordabilitv
4.3.1 Introduction
The Dandora project, as with the other sites and services
projects funded by the Bank in the 1970's, was shaped by the
goal of poverty alleviation which Robert McNamara had declared
as the Bank's principal focus. To make sites and services
projects affordable to the urban poor was therefore a central
concern in the Bank's formulation of the projects.
In the example of Nairobi, the magnitude of poverty
dictated the necessity of a large housing strategy aimed
specifically at the urban poor. In the early 1970's, Ksh 200
per month was estimated as the minimum income to sustain the
most basic needs of a household of five. During the same
period, 20 percent of adult males and 50 percent of adult
females in Nairobi (2) were either unemployed or had
inadequate incomes below the poverty line of Ksh 200 per
month.
2 The proportion of women headed households in Nairobi
was estimated at 10% in 1983. As cited in Bank Files.
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By 1977 over one third of Nairobi households fell below
the poverty level of Ksh 700 (US $12) per month needed to
sustain a household of seven (determined as the average
household size characteristic of squatter and low-income
communities.)
Even those at the 50th percentile of the Nairobi's income
were earning only Ksh 1500 (US $25) a month. But income alone
did not measure poverty. In Nairobi, a leading cause of death
and sickness amongst children was, and remains, malnutrition.
In the case of Nairobi and most other countries in the
developing world, a policy specifically targeted at the poor
did not represent an unbalanced attention directed at a
minority interest, rather it was a policy aimed at improving
conditions for the majority of urban dwellers.
However, there were specific limitations to the extent
which the Bank felt it could reach the poor.
4.3.2 Restraints on the Poverty Focus: The Ability to Pay
Back
The Bank's need to reach the poor was somewhat tempered
by its other goal, which was to ensure cost recovery as a
necessary precondition if the sites and services model was to
become an effective housing policy for Kenya. Hence, the
degree to which the project reached down into the lower-income
percentiles had to be balanced by the perceived capacity of
poor households to make the necessary monthly payments. Poor
58
households which had no apparent steady income, or where the
household head was unemployed, were considered too risky. A
steady income was therefore preferred. By definition, the
targeted recipients of the Bank financed sites and services
were not coming from the lowest of the low-income groups,
since steady incomes were not the norm within the lowest ranks
of the urban poor.
4.3.3 Restraints on the Poverty Focus: The Issue of
Subsidies
In my interviews with the Bank staff in Washington, there
was a clear impression made that the Bank did not want
subsidies in sites and services projects. If their declared
need to reach down into the lowest income percentiles was
strong, there were ways, one could argue, of making sites and
services projects affordable to the poorest urban households.
For example, lower and longer re-payment terms, and increased
subsidies in the loan package would increase the range of
targeted income groups and make the projects more affordable
to the lower income percentiles.
However, an increased subsidy element such as this was
not adopted in the sites and services program at the Bank.
While being explicit about making sites and services projects
affordable to the poor, there were other implicit factors
operative at the Bank which limited the extent to which they
could do so. In this case, a "higher order" need within the
Bank to avoid subsidies in urban shelter projects overrode the
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intention of the Urban staff to make sites and services
projects affordable to the lowest income households.
In my discussions with the Bank Urban staff, the issue of
subsidies was usually connected to the issue of replicability.
I was told that the projects had to be entirely self-financing
so that governments could replicate the projects on a larger
scale without a drain on their already tight budgets.
The Bank's desire to make sites and services affordable
to the poor must therefore be tempered by other forces at work
within the Bank, namely, to keep subsidies out of the loan
package and to recover costs from the households participating
in sites and services projects.
Having raised these two issues, the goal of affordability
can be stated more precisely. The Bank assisted sites and
services projects in general, and Dandora in particular, were
targeted to low-income recipients whose income ranged from
just below median down to the 20th percentile of the city's
income distribution. It is against these targets that the
Bank and others evaluate the projects.
4.3.4 How Affordability Was Worked Into the Project
(a) Infrastructure Standards
Because Dandora was designed to "pay its own way" the
costsof-infrastructure: sewers, roads, water, electricity,
etc. were factored into the price of the plots. It was
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therefore necessary to keep the costs as low as possible if
poor households were to be able to afford a Dandora plot.
The Bank considered the level of standards regulated by
the Kenyan codes to be unrealistically high given the revenues
which were likely to support them. As well, the government's
past insistence on building high standard services had led to
a situation where vast sectors of the population had no
services whatsoever.
The Bank's attempt to lower infrastructure standards for
Dandora, was met with considerable opposition from all sectors
in the government. The familiar claim that they were building
slums was again heard. This sentiment was embodied in the
government of Kenya's Development Plan for 1974-1978 which
acknowledged the need to build affordable housing for low-
income groups but at the same time wanted to "... insure that
housing design and construction conform to Government
standards and that each housing unit constructed in urban
areas have at least two rooms plus its own kitchen and
toilet."
In contrast to the government's position, the Bank
initially proposed that up to 25 households share one water
standpipe, thus reducing costs per household considerably.
With respect to Dandora, the NCC refused to consent to this,
and wet cores were built on all plots. Substantial cost
savings were realized by leaving roads unpaved, and keeping
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basic infrastructure hardware (pipes, drainage lines,
electrical connections, etc.) to a minimum standard.
(b) Building Standards
Similar to the debate relative to infrastructure, the
Bank found government officials resistant to a lowering of
building standards.
As a result of pressure from US-AID and the World Bank,
the Nairobi government formulated a set of codes which were
suitable for low-income housing projects. Dandora units were
therefore less expensive relative to middle-class housing
built to the regular code, but were still fairly substantial
units incorporating fire-proof stone walls, corrugated cement
roofing, a plot-coverage rating of 50% and large plot sizes
ranging from 110 to 160 sq.m.
(c) Self-Help Labor
Parallel to the aim of reducing building and site costs
was the strategy to lessen the allottees' expenditures for
labor by having the households themselves construct as much of
the unit as possible.
To facilitate this, Dandora site officials worked with
allottees to train them in laying foundation, masonry
construction and other skills needed to build the unit.
(d) Income Generation
In the interests of affordability, the Dandora project
design supplemented its strategy of reducing costs with a
means to raise the incomes of allottees through the renting of
rooms on the plot, and the inclusion of 400 market stalls for
small business operations of resident households.
In Nairobi the rents generated from the letting of two
rooms could easily cover the entire monthly payments required
by the allottees. This renting opportunity, which the Bank
advocated, had an enormous impact on the project's ability to
sustain low-income households as home owners.
e) Cross-Subsidies
Although the Bank would not allow subsidies from outside
the project, a system of cross-subsidies internal to the
project was allowed. Specifically, as part of the originally
formulated construction package, 300 plots were developed with
wet cores, and two rooms on the largest plot originally
offered (160 square meters)(3) These dwellings were then sold
at market rates and the profits funnelled back to reducQ the
price of the smallest plots available to the lowest-income
allottees. This cross-subsidy allowed for cost reductions on
these plots of approximately 18 percent.
3 In Phase II of Dandora, plot sizes were increased from
a maximum of 160 square meters to 240 square meters in
response to the demand for more space to construct rooms.
4.4. Home Ownership
4.4.1 Introduction
A fundamental principle of the sites and services model
was the establishment of home ownership through the allotment
and purchase of plots. Legal land tenure was essential to the
"mechanism" of progressive development - only through secure
tenure could an incentive be established for the investment of
labor and capital in the development of the plot. In
addition, home ownership for the poor provided access to the
"unearned increment" or "betterment"(4) which was formerly a
source of capital available only to higher-income property
owners. Thus ownership was perceived as a tool for helping
to balance highly skewed income distributions.(5)
Yet home ownership was also promoted as an ideal
associated with: stable communities; a healthy family life;
4 The terms "unearned increment" and "betterment" refer
to the rise in economic value of a property caused by urban
development in general, and access to services provided
publicly. The increase in, for instance, attainable rents or
the potential selling price for a property are attributed not
to improvements to the property itself, but for improvements
to the surroundings for which the property owner, in a direct
sense, has usually not paid for. Hence, the term "unearned".
5 For a discussion on distribution of "betterment" see
World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 283,- -b-_LandPo1icy
Issuesand_Qppgritities, Volume 2, May, 1978.
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relief from exploitation by landlords; and the nurturing of
"self-pride-, autonomy and independence.,"(6)
This latter perspective on home ownership is enormously
significant, for it assumes not just the granting of a
freehold to the sites and services allottee, but the condition
of owner occupancy as well.
4.4.2 Home Ownership vs. Rental
In Nairobi, the issue of owner occupancy had emerged as a
matter of debate in relation to project design for sites and
services. The first project completed in Nairobi was USAID's
UMOJA I "core housing".
Similar to Dandora, the project was targeted for "below
median" income allotments. While the project was successful
in giving home ownership to the low-income group, it was
discovered that a majority of the original allottees quickly
rented the entire units, and moved back to their low-rent
rooms in squatter or informal settlements.
A report on Umoja I prepared by the University of Nairobi
in 1978,(7) found that at least 60 percent of the Umoja houses
6 From USAID Files: In my research I found that the
ideals associated with home-ownership were not explicitly
stated in the project appraisal documents, but seemed to have
been assumed at the outset. Only in final evaluation reports
are these assumptions explicitly discussed and questioned.
7 University of Nairobi Bureau of Educational Research,
TheResidents of UmoaHousingEstate, March, 1978, p. 10
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were not occupied by the original low-income allottees. By
1982 the final USAID evaluations found that this figure had
risen to over 75 percent, and that overall the income levels
of the occupants fell in the middle to higher income range.
Many observers both within USAID and the Nairobi City
Council (NCC) took these figures as an indication of failure
for two reasons. Firstly, although the project had
specifically stipulated that rentals or selling of property
could not occur within five years of allotment, the NCC had
been simply unable to enforce this provision. In this sense,
project implementation had failed to meet its original
objectives. Secondly, the interpretation of home ownership
which assumed owner occupancy and its associated ideals was an
interpretation apparently not shared by the allottees
themselves. The objective of relieving the poor from
exploitation by landlords had been achieved for those
allocated units, but since they assumed the role of landlords
themselves, this objective had been strangely contradicted.
Certainly, to some, the vision of a stable, well-maintained
community seemed to be in jeopardy.
However, from the perspective of the allottees, UMOJA I
provided them not only with affordable housing which they
could live in if they desired, but also the potential to earn
rents which were from 70% to 106% (8) above the amount of
their monthly payments to the City Council. Given the choice
8 Ibid, p.10
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of forfeiting this income by living in the unit oneself, or
channeling the income into other perceived priorities such as
buying equipment for a small business or funding a child's
school fees, the decision to supplement a previously meager
income was not surprising. Indeed, through rentals, the
allottees were actualizing the unearned increment which
otherwise would be unavailable until the time when the
property was sold.
A dilemma thus surfaced in the design and the very intent
of the sites and services projects. Was the-objective of
public policy to provide housing for the poor as shelter per-
se, or as a means to other ends which would benefit the poor?
The position of local officials in Nairobi seems to have
been based on a belief that their "charity" in providing for
the poor had turned into an entrepreneurial embarrassment. It
"looked bad" that housing intended for low-income occupants
was in fact being enjoyed by middle class renters. Perhaps
more important, the policy of providing legal, affordable
housing was intended to lessen the proliferation of squatter
and unauthorized housing. Instead, the project allottees
seemed to stay on in these settlements where rents were still
cheapest.
Both within the lending agencies and local government,
people were of two minds about which direction to take.
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The first direction insisted on disallowing the renting
of units through better enforcement, and the design of housing
lay-outs which "discouraged" the letting of rooms. The second
accepted rentals as an inevitable practice, and attempted to
mitigate any negative aspects by designing a unit suitable for
partial renting with owner-occupation.
As a result of pressures from local officials and State
Department "auditors" USAID continued along the path of owner
occupancy with UMOJA II. The difficulty they faced was that
by eliminating the renting option, the lowest-income allottees
would have to rely solely on external income to cover monthly
payments. Thus project calculations could not "factor in"
full or partial rental income in determining the level of
accommodations which an allottee's income would support. As a
result, UMOJA II could not reach into the lowest-income
groups. Yet, it offered the most minimal accommodations in
terms of plot size, access to services and unit size. Umoja
II also relied on a cumbersome condominium-type ownership of
shared courtyards, showers, toilets and sinks.(9)
9 How Umoja II works out in practice bears watching.
Construction began for this project in 1985.
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4.4.3 How Home Ownership/Owner Occupancy and Rentals Were
Worked Into the Project
In contrast to USAID's approach, the World Bank accepted
that rentals were unavoidable, especially in the context of
Nairobi's insatiable demand for housing from the low and mid-
income population. In the development of the Dandora project
the Bank included anticipated rents in their estimates for
low-income allottees. In theory, this allowed them to offer a
plot to a poor recipient who had no income whatsoever. Only a
down payment and some tie-over capital (until the first room
was built and rented) would be needed, as all monthly payments
could be covered by rental income.
a) The Owner Occupancy and Rental Option
Because of the increased purchasing power provided by
rental income, the Dandora project could offer a family a
substantial plot with a private shower, toilet, splash and
kitchen. Plot sizes of 100, 120, 140 and 160 square meters
allowed for 4,5,6 and 7 rooms respectively, per household
(assuming 50% of the plot was left as open space). Many
allottees coming from low-rent settlements would have
previously accommodated their entire family in a single room.
The Dandora plots allowed them to expand their own living
space and simultaneously rent-out at least two rooms. In this
manner, the Dandora project lessened the pressure for an
allottee to live off-premises while renting, thus mitigating
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any maintenance and stability problems associated with
absentee landlords.
The allowance for renting was something initially
resisted by many public officials in Nairobi for the reasons
mentioned earlier. In order to avoid future disputes on this
issue, the Dandora loan disbursement was contingent on the
full acceptance by NCC of the renting option. NCC officials
were partially placated in the knowledge that allottees could
rent and owner-occupy simultaneously. Thus, both objectives
of affordability and the ideal of stability through home
ownership could be achieved.
b) Restrictions on Selling
The goal of home ownership was also worked into the
project by regulating plot turnover. The Dandora project,
similar to all the other Nairobi projects did not allow plots
to be sold within five years of allotment. However, if a plot
had to be sold for extenuating circumstances within this five-
year period, NCC would reimburse the allottee for the imputed
value of their improvements.
c) Legal Tenure Through Leasehold
The previous discussion of home-ownership may have
implied that Dandora allottees were given private, freehold
property rights on their plots. In fact they were given 40-
year leases from the Government of Kenya, (who owned the land)
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with the option to renew. In the Nairobi context public
leaseholds were considered sufficient for the home-owner to
feel secure in their investment, while allowing the government
to have ultimate control over the long-term development of the
city. (10)
4.5 Rep icabiIityand _Insti tut ionBui lding
4.5.1 Introduction
The World Bank saw sites and services as more than simply
projects: they were also the means to influence government
policy on shelter and infrastructure for low-income
pQpulations. By demonstrating the idea and feasibility of
sites and services, the Bank could influence a shift in
shelter policy and an increase in the productivity of public
investments in the shelter sector. The shift in shelter
policy was to be away from the public sector activities of
10 On this issue William A. Doebele writes: "While
tenure is generally considered a legal category, it is, just
as fundamentally, a matter of the state of mind of the persons
concerned. Stated operationally, the critical element may not
so much be the precise legal category involved as the
perception of the occupant of his security in relation to the
investment contemplated. Thus, in Africa, a renewable license
to occupy may give enough feeling of security to persuade its
holder to make substantial investment in residential
construction on the site. In Latin America, a 25- or 40-year
lease may not be regarded (given general political instability
and other factors) as being sufficient to elicit a similar
response," from World Bank Staff Working Paper #283, Urban
Land PolicyIssgesandOQgortunitiesv.2, May 1978, p.110.
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squatter settlement clearance and construction of a limited
number of public housing units, towards a policy of large-
scale servicing of lots for low-income families to develop
through self-help. The idea to increase productivity in
public investment in the shelter sector derived from the
contention in the international community that developing
country governments should not be in the business of building
housing, making large investments with their scarce resources
into small, high-cost public housing projects, particularly
when the demand for land and shelter was so extensive. The
international community, led by the UN and the large donors,
advocated that servicing sites would be a more efficient and
productive public investment in the shelter sector relative to
the production of finished housing units.
4.5.2 Why Replicate?
In the case of Dandora, the project was being initiated
in the context of a demand based on 600,000 new urban dwellers
estimated for the city between the years 1974 and 1980 as well
as the existing population living in 'illegal' and substandard
dwellings comprising a third of the Nairobi citizens. While
the project, which offered housing to a population of 48,000
could not in itself address this demand, it was intended as a
demonstration of a means for the government to do so at one-
third the cost of previous housing programs. Dandora was in
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effect, the prototype for future Kenyan sites and services
projects.
The intent to demonstrate the feasibility of sites and
services as the precursor to expanded construction of sites
and services projects throughout Kenya is revealed in the
Bank's project appraisal reports. For example, in the Dandora
report, the "justification and economic benefits" of the
Bank's first sites and services project in Kenya are listed as
follows: "the project will act as a precursor to other sites
and services in Kenya; it will influence Government policy on
shelter and infrastructure for low-income people; and it will
demonstrate the feasibility of a large-scale, self-help scheme
and lead to an overall decrease in public investment in the
sector."
The Bank's self-defined role was to introduce the sites
and services approach to recipient countries through
demonstration projects. The implementation of the projects,
though guided by the Bank's technical staff was intended as an
opportunity to apprentice local government officials, thus
giving them the skills and confidence to take-over the
execution of future projects.
4.5.3 Institution Building: Why Build Institutions?
In one sense, the institution building objective was a
direct outcome of the desire for replication. As stated
above, it was necessary to strengthen the expertise and
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management framework and the entire support system as a
prerequisite for the realization of future projects. But the
concept of institution building was also motivated by a
broader objective.
The hope embedded in institution building was that the
practical requirements of implementing large public projects
would have a kind of ripple effect through municipal
operations tangential to the project. For instance, the
technical capabilities to: a) survey, transfer and register
lands; b) extend infrastructure; c) expand public
transportation; d) extend social services (especially directed
at the low-income groups); and, e) collect user fees and loan
payments, would build-up the respective municipal departments.
In addition, the Bank anticipated that the entire political
machinery of approvals would be oiled by the demands of the
projects.
Ultimately it was also hoped that the momentum enacted by
the projects would create a snowball effect of new initiatives
within the entire urban management structure. As stated in
the World Bank's President's Report (quoted in Bank documents)
the principle objective of the Dandora project was:
"to encourage, through an initially relatively small
program, longer term institution building and
larger-scale development within the sector as a
whole."
4.5.4 How The Goals Of Replicability And Institution Building
Were Worked Into The Projects.
a) Special Project Unit
Replication of projects was dependent on the long-term
capacity of the local government to undertake them. The Bank
wanted to train a core of professionals who would, after
Dandora, initiate new projects. But the Bank's evaluation of
the NCC suggested that a more efficient means of training
sites and services staff was to isolate them from the
inefficient, slow-moving city administration.
For this reason, and the need the Bank felt to execute
the project quickly, (see 4.7.5.a) a special, semi-autonomous,
project unit was formed. This unit was staffed by workers
seconded from other NCC departments as well as many expatriate
consultants whose role was to apprentice Kenyans.
In theory, the Dandora project unit could design its own
management and approvals structure geared specifically to the
task of implementing sites and services, and not have to rely
on the existing institutional structure.
b) Studies To Develop Institutional Capabilities
Various studies with recommendations for improvements in
NCC operations were tied to the disbursement of the project
loan.
Most significant of these was the IMF's Municipal Finance
Study which required extensive reforms in the management of
the NCC and its operations relative to the collection and
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accounting of tax revenues. A principle recommendation of the
study was the need to revalue property taxes in the city as a
whole.
Other studies focussed on the need for a reorganization
of the NCC's cumbersome approvals and committee's process
which were responsible for lengthy delays in project
execution.
UNICEF became involved in the Dandora project by
sponsoring a survey of nutritional standards in the project.
This resulted in the training of the Community Development
Division (CDD) within the project unit in techniques of
community education, for health care and nutrition. As a
result of their analysis the UNICEF study led to the inclusion
of temporary health and day-care centers during project
implementation. These were eventually replaced by the
permanent facilities called for in the project design.
c) Required Improvements in the Structure
of Local Institutions
Through the IMF and other studies, specific reforms were
demanded by the Bank in NCC's operations before project loans
were released.
For instance, Dandora placed an enormous task on the
sewerage management capacity of the local government. As a
result the Water and Sewerage Department of NCC were to be
reorganized in anticipation of these new demands. A similar
76
reorganization was required in the NCC's housing management
sections.
Additionally, reform in the hiring and compensation
procedures of NCC were essential if the city was to attract
and maintain well-qualified staff. The loan conditions called
for new guidelines and implementation of reforms in these
areas.
4.6 CostRecovery
4.6.1 Introduction
There are two sets of arguments about why costs should be
recovered in full for housing. One set of arguments is
related to the "givers" of housing and the other to the
recipients.
On the givers' side, the argument for cost recovery
relates to replicability. If sites and services projects are
to be replicable, and to be so on a scale necessary to absorb
the increasing populations, the projects must be self-
financing. If scarce subsidies are applied to a single
project, then there will not be enough to carry on with
successive projects. From the givers' side, replicability is
the chief argument for cost recovery.
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4.6.2 The Recipients' Perspective
From the recipients' point of view, replicability of the
projects is not really a concern. In the sites and services
cases examined, the users'perspectives on cost recovery were
stated more in terms of "Why should we have to pay? - Our
neighbors in the project are not paying.", or "Why should we
pay? Our water is not working, the roads have not been paved,
the garbage has not been collected." or "Why should we pay
when we can squat for nothing?" What this amounts to is the
rationale of "Why pay when we might not have to?"
In the first case, ("why should we pay, our neighbors are
not paying"), once payments arrears begin to accumulate and
are not checked, the entire project's repayment record goes
into arrears, because news travels fast that others are not
paying and nothing is happening to them. In the second case,
("why should we pay, our services are not working"),
inefficient project management and delays in servicing cause
households to withhold payments, which, over time, become
uncollectible. In the third case ("why should we pay, people
in Mathare are not paying"), households realize that there is
this "free" alternative in the market and, sometimes the new
plots in the sites and services projects do not have the
advantages of location which the more central city squatter
settlements enjoy.
But another rationale for cost recovery, neither distinct
to the givers or users perspective, is related to the fact
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that housing represents such a lucrative asset. Because sites
and services offers secure ownership of land in short supply,
and the fact that the units, once built, can be rented, a plot
is in fact a productive asset which should be paid for. This
"should pay" argument is particularly evident when plot
rentals are more than covering the monthly mortgage payment,
but the plot is in arrears.
4.6.3 The Bank Reality
The question of cost recovery was addressed to a number
of urban staff at the Bank and a somewhat different answer, or
at least a derivative of the replicability rationale was
given. When asked why cost recovery was such a central force
- one of those non-negotiable components of the projects - the
response was that the Urban division had to pull its own
weight. Urban had to be self-financing relative to the other
sectors at the Bank. This was related to the way "urban" was
thought of as a sector both within the Bank and within
governments. Housing within the urban sector, was considered
but one component of a larger system in which it was not
assigned a high priority position. The view of urban as a
bottomless pit by national economic planners, for example,
seemed to be evident at the Bank.
The Urban division had to disprove this "bottomless pit"
attitude of the macroeconomic planners at the Bank. As one
staff member stated, "there were to be no subsidies for urban.
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McNamara's call to alleviate poverty was intended for the
rural poor. If any subsidies were to given, it would be to
rural. Urban had to pull its own weight." The fact that
"urban had to pull its own weight" meant that cost recovery on
the sites and services projects was critical for the Urban
Department's credibility.
In negotiating a project with a government who, for
example, did not feel users should have to pay, as in the case
of the Nicaraguan Earthquake Reconstruction project, the Bank,
according to one official, would not negotiate on the cost
recovery item.
4.6.4 How Cost Recovery Was Worked Into The Project
a) Stable Income
The first measure the project formulators took to
safeguard cost recovery was (as mentioned previously in 4.3.2)
to make sure that allottees were capable of making monthly
payments. In Dandora, the cheapest plot option was to be
affordable to households earning a monthly income of Ksh 280,
which assumed a 25 percent expenditure for shelter and
services. This plot option was intended to be affordable to
households as low as the 20th income percentile.
b) Downpayments
Another feature that was built into the projects to
ensure cost recovery was the regulation of downpayments. A
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10% downpayment was required by each eligible allottee. The
ability to pay a downpayment was considered by the Bank to be
a signal of a number of things: one, some proof of stability -
the person has savings So must be stable and therefore able
to handle a mortgage; two, some sign of dedication to the
project - a person who raises a downpayment is serious about
the project and what it represents whereas if it were free to
start off with, anyone could enter into the project and then
default on payments; and, three, the risk of losing a
downpayment was a strong incentive to make the project succeed
by building up one's plot and keeping to required deadlines.
c) Repossession and Eviction
The Bank also formulated regulations in the projects
which governed arrearages and default if cost recovery ran
into problems. In Dandora, the project unit could repossess
lots and any buildings in cases of default. After two months
in arrears, a first warning notice was to be sent. After a
six-month delinquency, final notice was given with a
notification of eviction unless the delinquent account was
reduced to four months by a given "set time". At nine months,
an eviction notice would be sent, allowing the family or
occupant four weeks to vacate.
Eviction, water lock offs and this system of notices,
warnings, etc. were written into the mortgage agreement with
the allottees in the sites and services projects as a means of
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ensuring cost recovery. The project staff felt it necessary
to at least have this punitive system on paper. The absence
of such would lead more easily to a decision not to pay.
d) Urban Management
Another way in which the Bank's need to ensure cost
recovery was worked into the projects occurred at the city
level. As part of its loan agreement for Dandora, the Bank
called for a number of urban management and policy reforms.
The IMF's Municipal Finance Study for example was part of this
loan agreement and called for the reorganization of Nairobi
City Council's operations, budgeting and accounting. Cost
recovery depended on the appearance if not the actuality, of a
strong collections and enforcement system. NCC had a poor
record in this regard.
Similarly, with the Bank's Kayole project in Nairobi,
urban management policy reforms were included as part of the
loan agreement, covering property tax reform; establishment of
a valuation unit within the Ministry of Local Government for
setting general rate levies; preparation of regulations to
control accounting and financing of housing related
activities; and, agreement that the funding of the local
authority be ensured by the Government of Kenya. Similarly,
in the Lusaka loan, a number of legislative conditions were
attached, including for example, revaluation of the property
tax for increased local revenue and the enactment of new
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housing legislation to provide a legal basis for the
registration and tenure of land in Zambia.
What all this adds to is a series of measures designed by
the World Bank that were to insure the capability of the local
government to enforce cost recovery on the projects, and to
increase its revenues in general which would build a healthy
local government administration. This latter revenue
producung aspect of the Bank's technical assistance on the
projects might also be interpretted as a safeguard: if the
residents did not pay back the local government, then at least
the local government would have revenue from other sources to
pay back the loan to the Kenyan Government and in turn, to the
World Bank.
4.7 Project_ppearance _nd The Need For Speed
4.7.1 Introduction: Selling the Idea
The status of the projects as demonstrations carried with
it a great deal of pressure to ensure that: a) the project
implementation ran as smoothly and swiftly as possible; b) the
goals set forth in the project design were achieved; and, c) a
satisfactory and pleasing product resulted. The source of
these pressures was related to the need to sell the idea of
sites and services to a reluctant local government.
At the national level, the sites and services concept had
been part of official housing policy in Kenya since 1967. (11)
(The Dandora project appraised in 1974 was the first (12)
large-scale project to use the sites and services concept in
Kenya.) Despite the rhetoric of official policy there was
large-scale opposition to the sites and services approach at
all levels of government.
However, for the national government sites and services
project loans offered access to much sought-after foreign
excjhnge. (13) Meanwhile, the local governments were left
with the burden of implementing the project and repaying the
loan back to the national government. A very reasonable fear
at the local level was that inflation combined with defaults
and slowdowns in the collection of monthly payments from
allottees would result in an ever-increasing allocation of the
municipal budget to service the debt, in effect, resulting in
massive subsidies for housing from the city which it could not
11 The sites and services approach to housing was
adopted as official policy in Kenya after a 1964 UN mission
was led by L. Blumberg and C. Abrams.
12 US AID was also in the process of giving approval
for a loan for 6,0O units in 1975.
13 The IDA/Bank loan for Dandora of 14 million dollars
was initially absorbed by the Kenyan Finance Ministry in US
dollars. The Ministry then on-lent the loan in Kenyan
shillings to the Nairobi City Council.
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afford. As a result, some government officials had serious
reservations about taking on the projects.
The second source of pressure was derived from the Bank's
internal operations. The Bank's project staff were
accountable to the home office not only for the quick and
successful disbursement and recovery of loans, but for the
quality of the final product as well.
Additionally, in lending for development, the task is not
one of just moving money as one would find in other forms of
commercial lending institutions. Commercial banks, for
example, whose central reason for being is to move great sums
of money, do keep tabs on how the money being lent is being
spent, but not in any direct sense as supervising project
implementation. Evaluation and success are largely measured
against quantitative criteria (i.e. profits generated, dollars
loaned, etc.) rather than a qualitative analysis of the
product achieved with the bank's money.
Not so for the World Bank. Each project is carefully
monitored by comparing the original goals of the project
against on-going appraisal reports. There is a strict system
of accountability related not only to things measured
objectively (i.e. is the loan being repaid?) but also to more
subjective criteria (i.e. Does the project "look" good? Does
it look like a "slum" or "shanty town" or something better?
Does this project reflect well on the Bank? Can we show it to
the Bank President as an example of the good things we in
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Urban are doing? Are we influencing our "client's" policy?
Are we teaching them improved techniques for efficient
development?)
These combined pressures led to the establishment of two
additional and related goals in project implementation:
1) the need to make the physical appearance of the
project as pleasing as possible; and,
2) the need for speed in the consolidation of plots
and the general execution of the project.
4.7.2 Project Appearance
In addition to the aforementioned reluctance of local
officials to commit to sites and services for fear of
additional financial and manpower burdens, there was a very
real suspicion associated with the self-help movement in
housing. Local governments were already sensitive to what
they perceived as sprawling blemishes on their cities caused
by squatter settlements. They argued against lowering
standards in sites and services for fear of being seen as
building slums themselves.
In this light, sites and services had to be proven: they
would not develop into slums, but rather into "nice-looking
communities". In effect, the idea of progressive development
had to be put to the test. As demonstration projects, the
Bank's sites and services had to reveal themselves to the
local government officials as attractive, secure and
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responsible communities. The Bank was, therefore, interested
in achieving a product that was acceptable to the governments
who were waiting accusingly in the wings.
4.7.3 How Project Appearance Was Worked Into the Projects
Regulations on building standards and materials were
included in the sites and services projects. The rooms built
on each site were highly regulated in this regard. The
allottees had to build to a specific uniform standard of
dwelling and with specified building materials in order to
maintain the quality of the project. These standards of
building were seen by the project staff as a means to
guarantee that the governments would be in favor of the final
product.
a) Building and Material Standards
It should be added, however, that the Bank and other
donors argued strongly with local officials to lower
standards. In the Dandora project intense conflicts with the
local government arose over this issue.
In my review of donor-assisted housing projects in Kenya
and from interviews at the Bank regarding other projects, it
has become clear that local governments have a strong interest
in maintaining high building standards for low-income projects
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in accordance with existing building codes initially designed
for middle and high-income housing.
However, in the interests of affordability, the Bank and
other donors set out to convince the governments to lower
these standards for their assisted low-income housing projects
in order to make the sites more affordable to the urban poor.
In Kenya, for example, a compromise was worked out whereby the
Nairobi local government adopted a lower standard of services
and house construction as a result of pressure both from the
donors and from the national government, the latter being
anxious to attain the loan and resulting foreign exchange.
This lower standard was begrudgingly adopted by the Nairobi
City Council despite continued claims that they would be
building slums.
For the Bank, the lower standard that was adopted was not
as low as desired but was an improvement over what the
building code originally prescribed. Hence, costs could be
brought down on the projects.
The end result for the households, however, was still a
set of construction and building materials standards and
regulations to which they had to comply. As a result, self-
help construction became more difficult and expensive as
detailed in the following chapter. Moreover, the spirit of
sites and services which was to loosen up the shelter system
for the poor, became a rigid program of construction with
deadlines and standards difficult for an inexperienced
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household to meet and build to. Despite this conflict with
the recipient governments over the issue of building
standards, it remained, however, at the demonstration level,
important to the Bank to ensure its sites and services
projects developed into a "quality" project that the
governments could appreciate, and therefore be willing to
replicate on their own.
b) The Addition of Community Facilities
The Bank's need to have the sites and services project
develop into a "nice looking community" was also achieved by
the inclusion of "extras." For example, a large number of
community facilities were included, in addition to set
requirements on open space as well as street lighting, all of
which were lacking in the squatter settlements of Nairobi.
Bank staff members described the project additions as a
"Christmas tree approach" where the Bank added on to the basic
low cost scheme, a number of ornaments to "decorate" the
project. In Dandora, these included 2 nursery schools, 6
primary schools, 2 health centers, 2 community centers, and 1
sports complex. By contrast then, the Dandora project would
look like a very tolerable, if not an attractive alternative
for the Nairobi City Councillors to the squatter settlements
in the city.
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c) Temporary Dwellings
The Bank's need to sell the idea of sites and services to
recipient governments also affected the projects in other,
less obvious, ways. The Bank's desire to make the projects
look qood so that the governments would "buy the idea" often
caused rules and regulations to be built into the projects
which increased construction costs for the residents. For
example, in Dandora, as part of the project design, the
allottees were encouraqed to construct a temporary shack on
the lot for use during permanent construction. However, it
was regulated that after 18 months once the first permanent
room was built, this temporary shelter had to be torn down.
It would seem that this rule existed solely for visual
reasons, to avoid the appearance of substandard dwellings on
the project site. The temporary shelter was in fact found to
be useful for storage and security of building materials
during construction of the remaining rooms.(14) It was also
found that it was useful for continued residence by the
allottee, as it was more beneficial to rent out the first
permanent room to help finance the rest of the dwelling
construction. However, the project as it was designed by Bank
and local project staff from the beginning, called for the
demolition of the shack, for reasons of appearance.
14 Praful Soni, "Self-Help Planning Construction and
Management in a Site and Service Project in Nairobi, Kenya,"
Ekistics 286 (Jan/Feb 1981): 53-64.
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4.7.4 The Need For Speed
a) The Field Reality
As it may be apparent, the need to consolidate plots
quickly - get them built-up and looking complete - was very
much related to the need for the project to look good.
Although the Bank had faith that the sites and services
community would become a quality community through progressive
development, they had to make it "progress" a little faster.
The problem the Bank faced was as follows.
The sites and services concept was based on the notion
that the city government would simply help to initiate a
"process" by providing the raw materials ("sites" and
"services") to build upon over time. The allottees would do
this according to their own capabilities and schedules. But
the Bank staff were also under intense pressure from the local
government to achieve a product quickly.
For instance, the NCC insisted that on each plot
allotted, two permanent rooms had to be built according to
official standards, within 18 months from the date of
allotment. In other words, the local officials would not wait
for progressive development, and their judgments on the future
of sites and services projects would be based on initial
impressions of the project.
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b) The Bank Reality
From my discussions with Bank staff in Washington and in
the field a tension could be felt in the way they talked about
their work. This tension was related to the constant need to
execute their projects as rapidly as possible. They spoke of
project "successes" in terms of speed - speed in appraisal,
speed in negotiations, in loan commitments and loan
disbursements, and speed in project consolidation.
One could not help but read into all these references a
need, when it comes to projects on the part of the Bank, to
"get in and get out quickly", get the projects completed and
move on to the next project, not surprisingly since the Bank
measures staff performance in terms of speed of project
execution.
Indeed, once a project was appraised and "on line" Bank
officers would often delegate the rest of the tasks and start
up a new project. It was considered good for appearances at
the Bank to have a few projects on the go. When rewards such
as career advancement depend upon one's performance in terms
of loan disbursements per-man-hour measured against some norm
as well as against other colleagues' work, objectives such as
getting in and out of projects quickly, taking on more than
one project at a time, and other aspects of moving quickly
through the entire project cycle, becomes more important in
terms of professional work.
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4.7.5 How the Need for Speed Was Worked Into the Project
a) Special Project Units
My review of sites and services documents for the Dandora
and other projects, and interviews with project staff in
Washington revealed that the Bank attempted to insulate the
projects from local political conditions and the existing
bureaucracy to as great an extent as possible. I believe that
the ultimate motive was to increase the speed and efficiency
of project execution and ensure a wrinkle-free product.
In order to achieve this, the project formulators
considered it necessary to avoid channelling the execution of
the projects through existing city management. Specifically,
the Bank saw that bottlenecks, delays and damage to the
projects' credibility could come from three sources:
1) the local administrative bureaucracy, i.e.
municipal departments of planning, public works, utilities,
finance, housing, etc.;
2) local or national political representatives,
including politicians, community leaders and the existing
political dynamic; and
3) the detection and publicizing of corrupt practices
such as bribery or the misallocation of funds and plots.
The Bank staff interviewed in Washington argued that in
operating as a development bank they needed to be
"apolitical." I believe the meaning imparted with their use
of the term "apolitical" was that the Bank as a multi-lateral
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aid agency had to remain neutral and avoid being associated
with any one power group - a kind of professional
impartiality. However, the reality of the apolitical stance
was actually much less altruistic.
What they hoped for was that by disengaging the approvals
process and management of implementation from the local
bureaucracy, they would be able to build the project smoothly
and quickly.
In an effort to get around these three potential
obstacles, "special project units" were created specifically
for the execution of sites and services projects. (15) These
special units had the advantage of being partially outside of
the mainstream local government bureaucracy, and hence outside
of local politics, corruption, red tape etc. Thus, in theory,
the Bank's desire to execute the projects quickly and smoothly
was accommodated through this special unit.
These special units also had powers which could speed up
approvals and avoid costly delays in land consolidation,
subdivision and servicing. This meant removing some powers
from the normal city process and by-passing the usual approval
routes.
15 The Bank created special project units in many of
the first generation sites and services projects. For
example, special units were set up to execute the Bank
financed sites and services projects in, among others, Jamaica
(1974), Botswana (1974), Lusaka (1974), Korea (1974), and
Nairobi (1974).
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In the Dandora sites and services project, Bank project
officers hired officials from other related areas in the local
bureaucracy to staff the special project unit. Often these
represented the best staff inside the existing government
departments.
This secondment was made possible by the higher salaries
offered; better office conditions; various "perks" which
sometimes included a car; as well as a sense of power in terms
of the direct lines opened between the project unit, the World
Bank in Washington and the national levels of government.
In Nairobi, the special Dandora Project Unit, which
eventually became the Housing Development Department (HDD) of
the Nairobi City Council (NCC), was governed by both NCC
Councilors and representatives from the national ministries of
Housing and Local Government. This direct involvement of
Government of Kenya representatives in local government
operations was unprecedented.
This situation, combined with the fact that the special
project unit also took over some of the duties and powers of
the departments within the NCC, gave the unit's staff members
an unusual level of autonomy and power. The result was a
project unit that was: staffed by some of the best
professionals in the country; that had speedy approval lines
outside of the weighty local bureaucratic process; and was
perceived as accountable more to the Bank and national levels
than to the local government.
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The official rationale for the creation of a special
project unit, was stated in the Bank's Dandora Project
Appraisal report.
"The Unit is necessary because the Council's Housing
and Social Services Department is not capable of
implementing a project of this size and complexity
under its current organization and staffing."
The special unit was thus argued to be a way of building up
expertise within a new institution to implement the projects.
However, in my discussions with World Bank staff who had
been involved with sites and services for over a decade, these
independent units were never explained as a means to
institution building. In one such discussion it was stated
that "the governments have their own agendas when it comes to
these housing projects. We had to get the projects out of
governments' hands. Moreover, the Bank is trying to be a-
political so we try to avoid political problems since once
they have arisen we can't point a finger at the governments.
Especially in instances of corruption."
b) Fast Consolidation of Plots:
Construction Schedules and Deadlines
In most of the Bank projects surveyed (16) it was common
to place deadlines for each allottee on the construction of a
16 The sites and services projects surveyed are listed
in Appendix 2 and include some 20 cases.
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permanent dwelling. In Dandora, the allottee, as part of the
purchase agreement, had to build the permanent dwelling within
eighteen months. This regulation was enforced by threat of
eviction.
The requirement on the part of the allottee to build a
permanent dwelling according to the building standards
established by the project staff, and within a specified time-
frame, was significant not only as a way to hasten project
implementation, but also as a way to ensure the quick
appearance of a nice community.
This was accomplished both through the regulation on
building standards (the permanent dwelling had to be built to
a specified standard using accepted materials) and the
regulations on construction schedules for both the household
rooms and the community facilities, street lighting, and site
servicing.
c) Fast Consolidation of Plots: Materials Loans
Other components were built into the projects which also
kept the construction hurrying along. The inclusion of
materials loans not only helped to maintain a standard of
construction (especially when the materials stores were
located on site and offered as loans in kind), but their
inclusion also contributed directly to fast consolidation of
plots as needed by the Bank.
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The provision of materials loans acted in two ways to
ensure speed of construction. Firstly, materials loans
overcame the otherwise slow process of stockpiling materials
commonly seen in the self-help practice of progressive
development of housing. Secondly, they meant an instant
access to credit for materials and hence an immediate
commencement of construction.(17) The fast consolidation of
plots by the residents was therefore to be achieved both
through construction deadlines and access to materials credit,
both of which were designed into the Dandora program.
d) Fast Consolidation of Plots: Construction Loans
One further instrument to ensure the fast consolidation
of the site was the inclusion in the "materials loan" of
credit for hiring contracted labor. Although the guiding
principle behind the sites and services idea was originally
identified as self-help, my research has shown that this
vision could be quickly replaced by the Bank staff if it was
found to interfere with the Bank's need for speed.
In the Lusaka, Zambia sites and services Bank appraisal
for example, it is stated that self-help should be encouraged,
17 This override on the building materials loans vis a
vis the former practice of stockpiling in line with what a
resident's income allowed, not only meant an instant credit to
get construction under way, but also a long-term debt for the
households. The need to build a permanent dwelling within 18
months removed flexibility and pushed residents to contract
out much of the construction. Such outcomes will be presented
in the following chapter.
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but "only insofar as not to interfere with the timely
execution of the project". Hence if self-help was found to be
too slow, it was recommended that construction be done by
contractors.
Similarly, materials loans on the second World Bank
project in Nairobi, known as Kayole, were identified at
appraisal as being intended to cover both the materials cost
and the necessary hired-labor cost to construct houses up to
two bedrooms.
Although driven by the need for speed, this inclusion by
the Bank of credit for hiring labor was of great benefit to
the households, particularly
self-help construction of th
the deadlines being imposed.
states that self-help should
project down, this addition
labor can be regarded as a f
The need to ensure the
both for Bank organizational
related reasons cited above,
specific project operations.
those whose time to engage in
e dwelling was too limited to meet
In fact, although the Bank
be replaced if it slowed the
of credit for households to hire
orm of "guided" self-help.
timely execution of the project,
reasons as well as for the field
were translated into very
The sites and services idea,
when made operational by the Bank, was greatly transformed by
this governing principle of speed.
99
4.8 Conclusion
In the preceding I have attempted to identify and
describe seven central forces which I believe significantly
shaped the World Bank assisted sites and services projects,
and specifically, the Dandora project in Nairobi, Kenya.
As the reader may have already assumed, many of the add-
on objectives, such as the need for speed and to demonstrate
the actuality of a "nice looking community," which guided the
projects through implementation, directly contradicted many of
the original principles of the sites and services model. In
this sense the seeds of "failure" existed in the original
project design, although other unexpected outcomes seem to
have mitigated any major, potential shortcomings of the
project. I also hope to portray these problems, in the
following chapter, as inevitable outcomes of a first-time
project executed in an unexperienced institutional context. In
the final analyses, they do not overshadow the significant
success of the Dandora project, nor the power of the original
idea.
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5.0 OUTCOMES
5.1 Introduction
I have structured the following discussion on outcomes of
the Dandora project in a manner which measures the problems
discovered in implementation against the original objectives
of the approach. I therefore examine outcomes under the same
topic headings used in Chapter 4, but in this case I have
reversed the order in which they are presented. This is
simply a means of presenting the story in a way, which I
believe, is most informative.
5.2 Outcomes:._Pro ject _! ppkEaance_ and -the _Need_ fcsr__Speed
5.2.1 Introduction
The importance of project appearance, and the need for
speed in execution, were linked earlier to the Dandora
project's status as a demonstration project. The success of
the project in meeting these perceived requirements was mixed.
Ironically, it was the creation of the special project unit -
a move intended to expedite the management of the project -
which indirectly caused the project to be delayed by 2 1/2
years. The independence of the project unit alienated the
existing NCC departments to such an extent, that city
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officials began to obstruct the progress of Dandora as a, means
of exerting their authority.
While this situation led to cost overruns, the animosity
between Dandora staff and NCC also raised questions about the
extent to which the special project unit was serving the
purpose of institution building. The need to move the project
along quickly therefore countered other objectives of the
project. A more detailed discussion of these conflicting
goals is continued in the following section on Replicability
and Institution Building (Section 5.4) I will therefore focus
the following discusssion on the impact which the need for
speed and project appearance had on the ability of the project
to reach low income allottees.
5.2.2 Plot Consolidation
The 18 month deadline for building the first two rooms on
each plot was met by between 57% and 67% of the plot holders.
After 30 months, between 83% and 91% had completed these
rooms, and 99% had started construction.
Although many households neither had the time nor the
will to build on their own, the need for speed did interfere
with those who had the ability and inclination to do so. In
other words, the 18 month deadline on the Bank's projects
meant that the self-help process, as it was originally
conceived (as sweat equity or family labor), had to be ruled
out for such allottees as too slow.
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Contracting the work became a means to meet this
deadline, for those able to finance such ventures. However,
it appears, on closer examination, that the 18 month deadline
itself was not the guiding force in getting the rooms built
quickly by the allottees. Knowledge of potential income from
rent acted as a positive incentive for the households to build
as quickly as possible. In Dandora, a well organized labor
system developed, specializing in building these extra rooms
to the specifications required by code.
But the imposed deadline led to problems for the poorest
allottees who could not afford to hire outside labor. Many
used the materials loan, in part, to help finance contracting
labor, but this amount proved insufficient.
In Nairobi, I conducted an interview with a priest for
the Dandora Catholic Church who lived in the Dandora sites and
services project. He stated that the poorest families of
Dandora were in default and had been unable to build their
rooms within the imposed time frame. He had undertaken the
creation of a revolving fund with a small grant of $500 from
the Ford Foundation as a means to help the poor families in
the Dandora Parish who were facing these problems. He
personally administered this fund, and for each loan,
requested the family deposit their ownership cards showing
title to their plots with him. Once they had built the first
room and began deriving rental income from it to pay him back,
their cards were returned and the money was reallocated to the
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next family in need. As a result of his system, the threat of
eviction was waived by the local authorities.
One can see how vital rental income was in allowing the
Dandora project to reach low-income households. In most
cases, if income were not supplemented with rents, the hiring
of labor in order to meet deadlines would be impossible - and
self-help labor, too slow. Poor allottees could easily be put
in a position not only of acquiring substantial debts (plot
payments, materials loans, etc) but of effectively "over-
consuming" shelter by being part of a project which demanded
plot construction to a specific standard within an
unreasonably short period of time. Based on their experience
with Dandora, the Bank was able to convince local officials
that the deadline for plot consolidation in Kayole should be
extended from 18 to 30 months. For the poorest allottees of
Dandora it was therefore vital to be in a position to rent
rooms out as soon as possible.(1)
The anticipated progressive development of the plots
according to the priorities and financial resources of the
allottee was therefore not typical of Dandora. It was a
process akin to a traditional construction project with
predesigned structures and tight project schedules.
In the interest of making the project look as good as
possible, plot holders were forced to tear down wooden shacks
1 A more detailed discussion of how the lowest-income
plot holders coped with these problems is continued in section
5.6: Affordability
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which they had built when first occupying the site. Many
residents whose incomes depended on informal sector employment
had erected small vending shacks along the main streets in
Dandora. A formal market was built with the project! but a
vendor had to pay rent to use it. The informal shacks were
perceived by local officials as an eyesore reminiscent of the
uncontrolled squatter settlements. They were therefore
continually tearing down the informal vending shacks.
5.2.3 Summary of Outcomes: Project Appearance and the Need
for Speed
The need for a standard of project appearance and speed
in plot consolidation can therefore be seen as pressures which
worked against the kind of flexibility and progressive
development which the sites and services model originally
specified as a means to affordability. Fortunately, Dandora
was able to make up for these shortcomings through the income
earning potential offered by rentals. As stated earlier, many
of these pressures to move Dandora through consolidation
quickly, and to specify uniform standards in design and
materials can be attributed to the project's status as a first
demonstration. I would suspect that many of these pressures
have subsided now that the fact of a built sites and services
project has engendered its acceptance. Certainly the
appearance of Dandora with its rows of stone block houses,
uniform street and lot patterns - though somewhat brutal - has
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absoluteley no similarity to the much feared "slums" which the
project's retractors initially predicted.
Relief from these pressures will allow the re-emergence
of first principles of the sites and services model, which in
turn will lessen future projects' dependence on renting units
as a means of effectively subsidizing low income households'
participation.
Although renting proved to be of of vital importance in
the Dandora project, there will be a point (perhaps
theoretically) when the demand to rent rooms will be
oversupplied by new sites and services projects. Hence, when
this market is saturated, obtainable rents will no longer
cover the mortgage and utility costs incurred by the plot
owner. For this reason, it is important that the principles
of self help and flexible scheduling are maintained in the
formulation of future projects.
5.3 Outcomes: Cost Recovery
5.3.1 Introduction
Although cost recovery was viewed by the Bank as critical
to the success and future replication of sites and services
projects, it was one component which they seemed to have
little control over. Collections were the NCC's
responsibility, and for a variety of complex reasons, NCC
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appeared to have neither the means nor the will to enforce the
payment schedule of allottees.
5.3.2 Arrears
Six months after the completion and subsequent occupation
of Dandora's Phase I, only 13 plots out of 1,033 were in
arrears. By 1980, 72 percent of Phase I allottees were in
arrears. As of 1983, total arrears for Dandora stood at Ksh
4.7 million (US $650,000).
The explanation for these arrears cannot be traced to the
allottees' financial conditions. In the very early stages,
many of the lowest income allottees went into arrears and
needed assistance to get the first room built. However, once
the rental income was being received on the first room, an
inability to meet the monthly payments was no longer a reason
for the arrears. In fact, most Dandora plot owners were
making a substantial profit from rents. Something changed in
the allottees' perception of Nairobi City Council's will to
enforce penalties for non-payment of arrears.
5.3.3 Institutional Capacity
In fact the NCC did not seriously enforce the stipulated
penalties against delinquent plot holders. Although notices
of impending eviction were sent out, NCC staff were either too
overworked or unwilling to enforce these measures.
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This did not go unnoticed by the Dandora plot holders
which explains the rapid rate of arrears after an initially
successful collection period. A partial explanation for non-
enforcement may be the housing unit's lack of manpower to deal
with the volume of allottees.
In 1976 the housing unit was responsible for collections
on 1,000 properties which it handled manually. By the time
Dandora, Umoja I, and other smaller projects came on-line the
accounts were numbering well over 12,000. However, staffing
of the department did not substantially increase in response
to the new workload.
5.3.4 Municipal debt
Arrears in monthly payments from the allottees did not of
course lessen the obligation for Nairobi City Council to pay
its monthly premium to the Government of Kenya against the
World Bank loan. NCC was therefore forced to make up the
difference from its own budget. As no interest charges were
being levied against the allottees' delinquent accounts,
arrears translated into growing interest charges which NCC had
to cover. To compound this rising debt, NCC's payments for
foreign loans were susceptible to large increases as a result
of the devaluation of the Kenyan shilling.
I have not found any specific data on the financial costs
which the Dandora loans have placed on NCC, but a similar
situation developed with US-AID's Umoja I project in Nairobi,
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being built in the same period, for which figures are
available.
As a result of devaluation of the Kenyan shilling in 1979
and 1982, the monthly payments which NCC was receiving from
Umoja residents covered only 76 percent of the amount the city
had to pass on to cover the foreign debt. This meant in
effect that the city was subsidizing each of the 3,000 Umoja I
units at a rate of Ksh 1,025 (US $82) per year. (2)
The mounting burden which these projects were putting on
municipal budgets was making the prospect of replication less
likely.
5.3.5 Political Will
Perhaps the most pressing question which arises in light
of the cost recovery problems can be stated as follows: since
the mechanisms clearly existed to enforce cost recovery, why
did the government repeatedly avoid doing so ?
A shortage of manpower or weak management capacity to
enforce collections offers a partial answer. I believe a
fuller answer to this can be found through an understanding of
the role that public projects play in political life.
To governments involved on the giving side of low-income
shelter, housing acts as a very powerful signal of caring
about the poor in a city. This aspect of housing translates
into a high level political posturing in the field which is
2 US AID Files - Nairobi.
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critical to all functions of the housing delivery system,
housing policy changes and the replicability of housing
programs. In Nicaragua for example, during the earthquake
reconstruction project, housing was seen as a signal of caring
for the poor who had lost their houses. The Government
refused to charge for the new houses and hence recover costs
on the World Bank's assisted project, despite the Bank's
assistance on cost recovery.
Housing projects are a way of getting votes; gaining
influence; positions of power; popularity within a political
constituency; and, in addition, provide a means of maintaining
political stability. Housing programs and their successful
implementation are strongly dependent on an understanding of
this sector as a highly valuable political asset.
It is for these reasons that we witness the handing out
of titles to low-income recipients in a housing project
personally by the mayor of a city or the president of a
country (3). It is also for these reasons that countries
allocate investment into housing during times of social unrest
despite a stated priority to invest in industrialization
first. When political stability is threatened as a result of
poor housing conditions, a country's economic program can also
3 For example, in launching the "Million Houses Program"
in Sri Lanka the Prime Minister personally distributed titles
to low-income residents for new houses.
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be destabilized due to a concomitant decline in foreign
investment, tourism and a migration of industry. (4)
The fact that housing is of political consequence means
that the givers of housing may ignore the more political,
economic, and cost recovery aspects of shelter. Low-income
housing thus must be considered in light of its capacity to
act as a signal, as a means to something more, and as a
demonstration of an attitude about caring for the poor by
governments and international donors in their capacity as
"givers" of housing.
In Nairobi, there seemed to be a lack of will to enforce
cost recovery, which I believe, derived from the alienation of
politicians and local officials from the project
implementation task.
Because the method of implementation (via a semi-
autonomous unit) had minimized the involvement of existing
political figures, the project was likely perceived of little
value in terms of their enhancement amongst Nairobi's
constituents and power groups. In fact, it is probable that,
4 Charles Abrams identified this relationship between
housing and political stability in Jamaica and Columbia. He
stated: "When Jamaica elected to earmark 60% of a US grant to
rehouse squatters and made housing its top priority, it was
not because there was no need for more factories. The reason
was that the whole economic program would bog down, foreign
investment and tourism might begin to sense danger, and
political stability would be threatened unless the housing
problems were resolved. In Columbia, squatters caused as many
social problems, political discontents, and disorders that
industry in one of its cities began to move and the country
had to initiate a crash housing program to induce the rest of
industry to remain." (Abrams, 1964)
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in terms of political advantage, more could be gained by
opposing cost recovery. The political dynamic created by
Dandora was such that officials probably had an incentive to
be sluggish about collections.
Although speculative, I think there also may have been a
perception that a debt to the World Bank was actually not such
a serious thing. From the low-income plot owner all the way
to the NCC councilors they may have felt that eventually they
would be bailed-out from the mounting debt. Certainly, in
light of the NCC's lack of enthusiasm to enforce penalties for
arrears, Dandora plot holders could not be blamed for
operating on the not unreasonable maxim: "Why pay if we might
not have to?"
5.3.6 Summary of Outcomes: Cost Recovery
The ability to successfully recover project costs depends
on two important factors. Firstly, that the manpower and
institutional capabilities are equal to the task and secondly,
that those responsible for cost recovery have a vested,
political interest in its success and enforcement.
The first item seems to have been partially responsible
for the record of arrears on Dandora (and Umoja I). The need
for improved revenue collection underscores the importance of
focussing on areas of urban management.
More important is an appreciation by the Bank of working
within existing channels of political authority, although this
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suggests a slower pace of implementation and greater levels of
tolerance and patience. This lesson, though not unknown and
noted by the Bank, is a knowledge easily forgotten in the
confusion related to project implementation. Moreover, it
remains a prerequisite to: successful institution building;
establishing a will to replicate; and, cost recovery.
5.4 Outcomes:_ReplicabilityandInstitution Buidin9
5.4.1 The Dandora Project Unit
The Bank's effort to insulate project implementation from
the existing municipal administration by creating a semi-
autonomous special project unit seemed to have had a backlash
effect in terms of relations between the Nairobi City Council
and the project unit.
The project unit was set up and operative under the terms
of the appraisal in 1974. But by the end of 1975 the NCC had
already removed many of the powers originally assigned to the
unit which allowed it to make independent decisions.
Consequently, most matters pertaining to project design and
expenditures had to be approved by existing departments whose
jurisdictions overlapped with the project's various
components, such as engineering, planning, health, education,
sanitation and housing, all of which were represented by
various existing departments and committees. This weighty
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approvals process was precisely what the creation of the
special unit had set out to avoid.
More seriously, the existing Social Services and Housing
Department of the Council considered itself to have
jurisdiction over all matters related to city housing, though
its role was primarily to manage existing city-owned rental
projects.
By 1978, this conflict over turf was creating major slow-
downs. In addition, the presence of national government
representatives on the Board of the Dandora Project Unit was
threatening to the Councilors and officers of the NCC. There
was considerable antagonism between the NCC and the national
government resulting from the Government of Kenya's neglect in
transferring NCC its required reserve for operation. On the
other side the Kenyan government considered NCC incapable of
managing its finances, and were warning the city of an
impending financial crisis.
5.4.2 The Formulation of the Housing Development Department
In an attempt to rationalize the city's housing
administration and mend bruised egos, the Bank merged the
project unit back into the NCC. The hope was that all
authority related to housing development would be given to the
newly created Housing Development Department (HDD), and that
its operations would be independently controlled. However,
strong resentment prevailed, and the NCC refused to lessen the
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mandate of the old Social Services and Housing Department.
The city continued to insist that all decisions be approved by
the respective committees and all major decisions be cleared
by the Council itself.
One might well imagine the threat which HDD posed to the
status quo. Firstly, they controlled a massive budget for a
high profile project of major importance to the citizens of
Nairobi. In terms of perceptions, many NCC officials must
have wondered if they were going to get any credit for
Dandora. Secondly, the staff of the new department included
many expatriates and young, well-educated professionals.
Thirdly, the project had brought with it an entire body of
outside officials: the IMF, World Bank, 60K and dozens of
consultants to evaluate the performance of the Council.
Disbursement of the loan to Dandora was tied to a number
of reforms in administration, taxation, and accounting
procedures as well as a streamlining of the Council's approval
process. In effect, NCC officials were being told that their
incompetence would have to be resolved if they wanted the loan
for Dandora to proceed.
The consequent resentment which NCC officials felt was
directed not only at HDD but to the Bank as well. A former
official of the City Engineer's Department stated that before
Dandora, his department was "magnificent," characterized by a
staff who were "active and working together" but that "the
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World Bank loans started splitting us up" and "we became
competitive with each other."
In 1975 the City Engineer's Department had in fact been
responsible for the $10 million US AID core housing project.
The UMOJA I Project Unit operated entirely within the
established NCC. According to US AID's final evaluation of
the project, they concluded that the Engineering Department
was fully capable of implementing a sites and services style
project and UMOJA I was evidence that NCC could achieve this
without significant delays or cost-overruns.
This finding is significant, in terms of questioning the
Bank's justification for setting up a special unit. While the
Bank referred to the size and complexity of the Dandora
project as something which the existing NCC was incapable of
handling, could it be that the simultaneous implementation of
Umoja I and Dandora were simply overtaxing the normally
adequate manpower resources of NCC? In other words, the
competitiveness between the two aid agencies (USAID, World
Bank) which translated into a need to have the projects built
quickly, necessitated the Bank's use of an external
implementing body. If this was the reality of the situation,
the resulting friction between NCC and HDD could well be
understood.
Whatever the source, the overall bitterness which
characterized relations between the special projects
department (HDD), and other departments was responsible for
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delays on Dandora of up to 2 1/2 years resulting in
substantial cost overruns. By some accounts, the City
Engineer's and Health Departments became obstructionist in its
dealings with HDD, disapproving or delaying many decisions
which it had responsibility for. (5)
5.4.3 Misallocations
Because of past misallocations of plots in the USAID's
Umoja I core housing project to both city and national
government officials (6), an impression was left in Nairobi
that sites and services projects had plots up for grabs to
any government official who could exert enough pressure on the
local project staff. Given the high demand for housing in
Nairobi, this wishful thinking seemed to be spawned by the
extremely lucrative profits which holding a plot offered.
For these reasons, staff members of the special project
unit faced intense pressures to misallocate plots. A junior
staff member of the Community Development Division of HDD
responsible for plot allotments, recounted the quality of the
relationship between his office and the city government at the
time when Phase II Dandora and Kayole plots were being
allocated.
5 This is discussed more extensively in Section 5.6 on
Affordability.
6 See article in Appendix A from Nairobi local newspapers
which covered this story and publicized the list of officials
and officials' relatives who received the plots.
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"The then mayor submitted a list of names of people
he wanted plots for. A great deal of resistance
from our staff members was made when this occurred.
As a result, the mayor put all of the senior
officers on compulsory leave as a means of clearing
any opposition. The junior officers were threatened
with their jobs as the mayor could simply eliminate
their posts. They therefore would not object
publicly to the misallocation."
This event was partly responsible for delays in Phase II of
the Dandora project and subsequent sites and services projects
such as Kayole and USAID's Umoja II which were at the
approvals stage.
5.4.4 Re-evaluating Special Project Units
In Nairobi, the Bank's original hope that sites and
services projects would be replicated were beginning to fade
given the relations between the municipal government and the
staff of the special unit who had gained the necessary
expertise in project implementation. However, in the Nairobi
example, it is necessary to temper my argument of a causal
link between the structure of responsibility as set-up by the
Bank and the inadequacy of the Nairobi government to initiate
new projects.
The general mayhem of the Nairobi political scene at this
time,(7) (for reasons also unrelated to the projects), and the
increasing pressures to misallocate plots, made for a
situation in which any kind of smooth implementation was
7 See Footnote 7, Chapter 1.
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difficult, if not impossible. In this respect, the Bank's
desire to isolate an implementing unit from the chaos of the
existing administration could be viewed as the only reasonable
course to take if the project were to advance.
However, though I acknowledge the extremity of the
Nairobi context, certainly in the long-term the autonomy of
the special project units were destined to create problems
even in the most stable of circumstances. This is borne out
in the Bank's experience with special units in other
countries. For instance, from Bank files on the Lusaka Sites
and Services Project, appraised in 1974, it was found that
"...the self-contained nature of the Housing Project Unit and
the deficiencies of the Lusaka District Council led to their
growing apart rather than becoming more closely integrated
during implementation." As a result, the Bank has found that
"...execution of the project had only a limited effect on the
development of the Council's capabilities."
Bank evaluators recognized problems experienced with
these units in a number of countries and subsequently re-
evaluated the practice. This led to new or second phase
projects being executed within the mainstream local government
bureaucracies. Already, in appraising Kayole, the second
phase Nairobi sites and services project, the Bank stressed
"...the need for continuous involvement of all senior officers
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of the city council in project preparation and
implementation".(8)
5.4.5 Summary of Outcomes: Institution Building and
Replicability
In light of these events, the success of the projects'
objective to assist in institution building was mixed. On the
one hand, a body of well-trained professionals had been
apprenticed through the Dandora project, and would be
competent in undertaking new projects without the need for
large contingents of foreign consultants or Bank technical
advisors. But how would they fare in the old bureaucracy?
As it turned out, it often became difficult to fit
project staff back into the mainline city government. In both
the Nairobi and Lusaka cases, many of the seconded staff were
unable or unwilling to return to their original posts in the
government after having commanded higher salaries and the
related perks that went with positions in special units.
After project completion, many of the staff ended up in
private consultancy practices, often working on contracts for
the international agencies.
On the other hand, the ability of the city government to
act as an agent for future projects was compromised by the
8 Bank files - Nairobi, Kenya - Kenya Urban
Development II
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intense antagonism and resentment which characterized
relations between departments. Not only had the project
failed to build-up support amongst established city officials,
but the creation of the special unit had resulted in the
formation of a body of resistance against the projects.
Government appreciation of the idea of sites and services
in the end becomes the determining factor in whether sites and
services are adopted as a basic policy stance to the problems
of low-income shelter. Decisions of whether or not to
allocate scarce budgets to sites and services-style projects
are ultimately political in nature, tied to perceived pay-offs
and opportunities. Such decisions may be made by many of
those who were marginalized from any controlling role in the
first-round demonstration projects being financed by the Bank.
However, in terms of institution building and
replicability, this last point may be of no consequence. The
disruption which a project of this magnitude causes, with all
its associated pressures for fundamental reforms in
accountability and efficiency, are so intense that the entire
body of established officials and/or their operations may
simply be swept away.
Although an extreme case, certainly the Nairobi story
corroborates this analysis. Because of interferences on
behalf of councilors in the allocation of plots, as detailed
earlier, and in conjunction with the Kenyan Government's
perception of general incompetence, the NCC was suspended in
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February 1983. President Moi enacted its complete dissolution
in March of the same year.
One could speculate that the new breed of bureaucrats and
councilors who will eventually replace the Commission
appointed by the President, will be those who fit the
standards of reform called for. Thus, in a bizarre and
circuitous way, the foundations for institution building may
have been placed.
In attempting to evaluate whether the Dandora project is
being replicated or not, one is faced with the dilemma of
sorting out where the initiatives for new projects are coming
from -- the Kenyans or the donors?
In Nairobi, there was such a back-log of' "demonstration"
projects being financed by US-AID (Umoja II), the EEC, and the
World Bank (Kayole) (Mathare North), that HDD could not
possibly keep-up, let alone initiate its own projects.
Perhaps, the sheer momentum of all these projects will result
in a general acceptance of the sites and services approach for
future housing needs, at the point when these various
demonstration projects are completed.
The evaluation reports of projects undertaken in Nairobi
to date all seem satisfied that the concept of sites and
services and the need to lower building and infrastructure
standards have-been accepted by Kenyan officials. For
instance, a Bank evaluation of Dandora states:
"(Dandora) is now a highly visible physical fact.
It disproves by its presence most of the stated and
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unstated fears about this kind of project. The
success of the development of (Dandora) is also a
politically useful fact of life for the city
councils, which are now much more clearly unanimous,
in an informed way, in their support of further low-
cost housing development of this type."
5.5 Outcomes_:Home Ownership
5.5.1 Introduction
The Bank's decision to allow rentals in the Dandora
projects and the subsequent plot lay-outs which anticipated
this practice, has been a unique factor in the project's
success in reaching the below median income population of
Nairobi. The extent of rentals, however, was far beyond
anything anticipated at the time of project appraisal.
5.5.2 Rentals
By 1983, 65 percent of the total number of rooms in the
project were being rented and plots which were entirely
occupied by tenants stood at approximately 50% of the
tctal.(9) The pattern of allottees moving back to low-rent
communities and letting their entire plot, as anticipated by
the experience learned with UMOJA I, was extensive in Dandora.
Other indicators demonstrate the extent to which Dandora
plots were being used as an income generating asset. For
9 Bank files.
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instance, a survey conducted by Reverend George R. MacInnis
(10) showed that 86% of the kitchens built, as required by the
project appraisal, were being used either as a place for
sleeping by the allottee or as a rental unit.
Similar evidence of the maximizing of Dandora plots for
rental income could be found in observing the extent to which
the plots had been built up. For instance, a large number of
plots exceeded the recommended building coverage of 50 percent
and had built to 100 percent. In a few instances, buildings
were extended vertically: up to three stories containing a
total of 18 rooms per plot, exclusive of toilets, showers and
circulation space. Given the fact that rentals from two rooms
cover the necessary monthly payments for the plot, the profits
generated by these apartment buildings must be enormous.
5.5.3 Outcomes of Tenant Occupancy
Several studies (11) showed that the pattern of absentee
landlords did not lead to significant depreciation in the
levels of maintenance in the project. Nor was there any proof
that the stability of the neighborhood suffered as a result of
tenant occupancy. In fact, by 1983 the trend of allottees
living away from their plots was shifting, and many were
10 George R. MacInnis. Dandora SurveyResults.
Unpublished document, 1984.
11 Bank files.
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returning to live in Dandora. (12) This may suggest that the
period for which an allottee is an absentee landlord is merely
a phase in the "progressive development" of the owner's
financial foundation. Once debts have been covered, or one
becomes safe in the knowledge that future payments can be met
without jeopardy to property, the allottee may return to the
higher standards and spaciousness offered by the sites and
services plot. There is some evidence that such a trend is
beginning.(13) These findings, may in part placate the fears
of those officials who espoused the absolute necessity for
home ownership and owner occupancy. The Dandora project
suggests that the ideals of independence, stability and self-
pride can be attained through a strategy which incorporates
tenants.
5.5.4 Summary of Outcomes: Home Ownership
The ability to rent was fundamental in providing low-
income allottees with the financial resources necessary to
purchase and consolidate their plots in a relatively short
period. Renting rooms made it possible for the project to
consist of households well into the low-income range, 95% of
which were below the Nairobi median, and a substantial number
in the 20th percentile. In this sense, the Dandora project
12 Bank files.
13 See ahead in Section 5.6.5
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appears to have been a highly flexible project capable of
adjusting to the variety of priorities and circumstances
embodied by the allottee group. For many of the poorest
households, home ownership and the increased incomes from rent
dramatically changed their existence. In this way, the impact
of this project was remarkable.
5.6.0 Outcomes:._Affordability
5.6.1 Introduction
As described in more detail in the preceding chapter, the
Dandora project was designed with a view to affordability by
encouraging self-help, excluding construction of
superstructures, lowering standards and allowing rentals. In
many respects, the attempts to keep costs low for the actual
construction and purchase of the plot, became an uphill battle
as inflation and cost escalations related to project delays,
increasingly pushed the project out of reach for the lowest
income groups. Dandora's success in making the project
accessible to households below the medium income, can
therefore be attributed more to the income supplement provided
by rentals rather than to cost reductions in development.
5.6.2 Project Delays and Inflation
The Dandora strategy of lowering standards and excluding
the pre-construction of superstructures as a means of making
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the projects affordable, ran into problems. For example, the
Nairobi City Council insisted on building wet cores (splash,
shower and toilet) on every plot, as opposed to either sharing
between plots or having allottees build them later through
self-help. The result was that the project looked as if it
would have trouble reaching as many lower income recipients as
intended. However, the massive renting of rooms acted as a
mitigating factor in this, as previously discussed in Section
5.5.
While rental income eventually made plot ownership
achievable, the poorest of the target group experienced
serious difficulties in meeting the initial monthly payments
and building the first room on their plot. Due to project
delays, resulting from disputes over infrastructure design
standards and slowdowns in work to be done in-house by the
City Engineer's Department, project costs were higher than at
project appraisal. Specifically, the Engineering and Health
Departments refused to accept the infrastructure standards in
the project design just as Phase II was to begin. Their
position was perceived by HDD as an attempt to wield what
little authority these other departments had over the project.
Post project reports noted that the two departments had
accepted the standards at the beginning of Phase I, and that
the project negotiations and terms of agreement were based on
their prior consent to these standards. But the NCC
departments were intransigent.
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As a result, all of Phase II had to be redesigned to the
new, higher standards insisted upon. To minimize cost'
escalations to as great an extent as possible, Phase II (5000
units) was divided into two parts. The first section was
delayed 1 1/2 years and the second section by 2 1/2 years. In
addition, some aspects of project design had been relegated to
the City Engineer's Department. These tasks were given low-
priority status by the Department head, thus resulting in more
delays. The roots for this obstructionist attitude I believe
are linked to the initial alienation of existing NCC
departments from project implementation as previously
discussed.
As a result of serious project delays, plot charges were
80 percent higher than appraisal estimates causing serious
problems for the poorest allottees who were unable to get the
rental rooms built quickly. In addition, the materials loans
which were intended to fully cover the construction of the
first room proved insufficient due to inflation over the
course of redesign. In fact, the loan finally covered only
half the actual cost of building a room. The amount of the
loan was increased later in the project but due to inflation
still only covered about half the actual cost for constructing
the room. This was a serious problem for the poorest of the
allottees. Consequently, they failed to consolidate their
plots within the 18 month deadline, and entered a position of
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financial arrears on their monthly mortgage payments very
early on in the project.
5.6.3 Assistance for Lowest-Income Allottees
A number of interesting steps were taken locally to
assist these Dandora households. As mentioned above, the
Catholic priest of the Dandora Parish in Nairobi was managing
a revolving fund set up by the Ford Foundation to assist these
poorest households having difficulty coping in the sites and
services project. The priest was administering the fund by
giving interest free loans to families to assist them in
building their first room and holding their plot ownership
cards as collateral to ensure repayment so that the fund could
continue to help the other households in need of similar
assistance.
In addition, a number of households who were unable to
build their rooms due to the insufficient materials loan fund,
formed building groups. These groups would collectively apply
for the materials loan, pool that money to build a number of
rooms quickly, rent those rooms and build the others until all
their plots were consolidated. Building groups were organized
by the staff of the Community Development Division (CDD) of
the Housing Development Department (HDD) (14)
A further means of assisting the poorest allottees was
also created by the Community Development staff of HDD. The
14 From CDD interviews and HDD reports and correspondence.
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CD officers mobilized support from the National Christian
Council of Kenya (NCCK) and other voluntary and grant
organizations within Kenya and created a "Welfare Revolving
Fund." This was used to supplement the materials loans which
could not cover the costs of construction.(15)
Therefore, for the poorest allottees, a number of local
solutions were being found to assist them with affordability
problems until the first rooms were built from which income
could be attained. The better-off beneficiaries supplemented
their need for construction financing through their own
savings, loans from relatives and employers and from local
building societies.
5.6.4 Self-Help and Affordability
Although the Bank had intended that self-help
construction would be an effective means of making the
projects affordable to the poor, self-help was effectively
precluded in the working out of the projects. The
requirements on the allottee to engage in self-help within a
project that was as highly regulated and quickly executed as
the Bank's Dandora project, made the process of self-help
difficult for the low-income allottee.
In the informal settlements, self-help was something of
an independent process, flexible and slow enough to learn as
one goes. However, in the Bank's sites and services projects,
15 Ibid.
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the requirements were so extensive that allottees found sub-
contracting to semi-skilled and skilled labor to be the more
feasible alternative.
For example, the requirements of self-help for the
allottee included information gathering on building materials
and building materials prices (even with a project store -
allottees found that cost savings could be made if they
shopped around); seeking-out suppliers; making delivery
arrangements; keeping accounts and cost-control to allocate
finances; engaging in a construction process which entailed
conforming to standards set by the project; seeking approvals;
and, completing
months. All of
Self-help
therefore more
by Bank staff.
practical sense
since there was
units quickly.
households made
the process in the limited time frame of 18
this while commanding a steady income.
in the sites and services projects was
time consuming and difficult than anticipated
Sub-contracting the work not only made
in these terms, but also made economic sense
rental income to be derived by completing the
Self-help, especially for middle-class
little sense. Also for the wage-earning poor
households who had virtually no spare time away from work,
there was an opportunity cost associated with self-help:
self-help construction meant lost income.
The importance of self-help which was basic to the
original concept of sites and services gradually diminished
during actual implementation. Indeed, the Bank argued in one
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appraisal document that self-help was to be encouraged only to
the extent that it did not interfere with the timely execution
of the project.
5.6.5 Summary of Outcomes: Affordability
The monthly payments anticipated at the project appraisal
stage were roughly 55% lower than the final charges to the
allottees. Much of this increase was applied to the higher
income plots ("Option B") and the cheapest plots ("Option A"),
were maintained at 72 Ksh/month, which was affordable to those
earning an income of Ksh 290 per month, falling around the
20th percentile of the city's income distribution.
In 1976, the average room in Dandora captured Ksh
150/month for rent. By 1983, this had risen to Ksh 380.
Given the levels of payment necessary to cover the plot
mortgage (Ksh 72 for 100 sq. m. plot up to Ksh 216 for 240 sq.
m. plot), it is safe to assume that the incomes of plot
allottees had risen dramatically since obtaining a Dandora
plot.
An unexpected statistic on Dandora revealed that 44% of
households were headed by women,(16) and that these households
had more dependents than those headed by men. The women-
headed households were among the lowest income allottees in
Dandora. They tended to build quickly by contracting and then
16 Compared to the Nairobi average of 10% women headed
households. (From Bank Files)
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to sublet their entire housing unit and live elsewhere,
assuming the role of landladies in order to maximize the
financial benefit of plot ownership. By 1983, new survey data
was indicating that the women and families, and the poorest
beneficiaries in general who had sublet all of their rooms,
were then moving back to Dandora.(17)
This finding is significant for two reasons. First, it
tends to reverse the current thinking on the tendency of sites
and services project benefits to "trickle up" to higher income
groups. The more middle-income renters in the projects may be
a short term phenomena, which occurs while the original low-
income allottees use the time to develop savings and allocate
the initial income receipts for other priorities. Second,
this process reflects an outstanding measure of flexibility
which sites and services projects can offer to the low-income
allottees. In those cases where owners who decided to sublet
totally in the beginning are now returning to live in Dandora,
they have made decisions about how much shelter they needed to
consume relative to other investment priorities. The
possession of a large enough plot to construct additional
rooms from which to derive rental income, has given these low-
income households a very secure stake in the urban economy.
The surplus income being derived (above that necessary to meet
17 The proportion of women in Dandora, estimated at 44
percent, was high compared to a city-wide average of 10
percent. This and the above cited data is drawn from World
Bank files.
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their monthly mortgage and other payments) represents savings
with which investments into small businesses can become
possible. The Dandora plots offer both security as well as
income and hence a base from which households can take risks
and develop their own entrepreneurial interests. For example,
one plot owner I spoke to had enrolled his wife in a Singer
sewing class in Nairobi and was preparing to start up his own
small business as a clothing merchant, buying the fabric
wholesale, producing clothing, and selling it via a partner in
his home village. It is in this way that a targeted project
like sites and services can assist the poor, not simply in
terms of shelter, but also in increased opportunities for
development.
World Bank lending for projects targeted to the poor, in
this way can be interpreted as encouraging a more broad based
development. Unlike lending for a single industrial
development project, which does assist in creating employment,
the low-income recipient of a sites and services project is
not tied to a centralized system of wage earning, but rather
is given opportunities to develop in a more entrepreneurial
fashion. This kind of development is more akin to the United
States history where a broad based access to resources and
land supplied opportunities for individuals whose only
resource in migrating to this country often was their own
labor and initiative. The rural to urban migrant in
developing countries is in a similar situation. Access to a
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piece of land holding opportunities for rental income or other
income generating activities, provides a foothold into the
urban economy. It is in this way that a project targeted to
the poor., such as sites and services, can offer an alternative
style of development both at a personal level, and economy
wide.
This leads me to conclude that, in general, the project
was successful in providing housing to the targeted low-income
population. But even more successful was the extent to which
these housing units were translated into an income-generating
asset, which in turn allowed many of the allottees to escape
their situation of persistent poverty, low wages, unsteady
work, unemployment and dependence.
5.7 Summaryof Findings_
How did Dandora fare in light of the original objectives
which the Bank set forth? My evaluation of the Dandora
project has resulted in several findings which are useful as a
means to determine the relative successes and failures of the
sites and services approach funded by the Bank.
Despite the use of contracted labor, rigorous
construction schedules, demanding building standards
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and cost overruns, Dandora was able to reach the
targeted low-income population in the 20 - 50th
income percentile range.
The allowance of rentals for part or all of the
plot's rooms made the participation of the lowest-
income households possible, but moreover this
additional income led to a general improvement in
the allottees' independence and opportunities for
development which the provision of shelter alone
could not facilitate. Indeed this type of project
targeted towards poverty alleviation signals an
alternative model of development in that it offers
opportunities to the poor to develop their own
routes for access into the urban and national
economy.
Project delays did not seriously affect the final
product. Although delays resulted in increased
costs these were absorbed by reducing the quantity
and standard of the "add-on" project components such
as the schools, clinics, day-care centers, etc., and
by increasing the plot costs.
Despite the large number of rental rooms Dandora
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developed into a reasonably stable, well-maintained
community.
A core of well-trained Kenyan professionals was
apprenticed through the implementation of Dandora.
These sites and services "experts" are now capable
of implementing future projects without the need for
extensive, expatriate technical assistance,
providing that support and funding for future
projects are forthcoming from the government.
The achievement of Dandora managed to sway political
recognition of the need for lowered standards in the
government's approach to low-income shelter. The
prospect of future replication of sites and services
projects is therefore likely at some point, if not
in the immediate future.
While the interests of replicability may be
supported by the establishment of trained
professionals, and a general appreciation of the
merits of lowered standards, the alienation and
severe disruption of the political status quo which
the Dandora project engendered has led to the
development of a body of local officials who are
likely to resist future projects. (Although many of
these officials have been replaced)
Full cost recovery, on schedule, has not been
achieved to date, though the explanation for this
can be attributed to: a) the alienation of the
established NCC from project implementation; b)
poor management practices; c) inadequate manpower;
and, d) a perception that a World Bank loan might
not need to be repaid. Many of these problems are
typical of a first-run project of this magnitude in
a context of inexperienced institutions. The need
for a greater involvement of existing political
forces in project implementation and the improvement
in urban management practices are reforms directed
at this problem.
While Dandora was successful in demonstrating a more
cost-effective means of providing low-income
shelter, it did not reduce the public sector's
involvement in housing. Rather, it resulted in the
dedication of significant resources of manpower and
budgets to implement the project. In response to
this, current projects build in a 10% administration
fee to cover or off-set the amount of public funds
expended on the project. Increased efficiencies
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through improved urban management should reduce
these costs to governments. Eventually, the role of
implementation may be possible through private, non-
profit agencies.
5.8 Conclusion
I believe these findings lead to an overall evaluation of
the Dandora project as a success. These problems which
emerged from Nairobi's first experience with a sites and
services project underscore the need for improvements in urban
management and a revised approach on the Bank's behalf in
terms of the implementation of future projects within the
existing political dynamic.
There is no doubt in my mind that these problems can be
rectified. Certainly, the conditions of urban overcrowding
and acute poverty are as real now as they were in the early
1970's and the situation calls for attention just as loudly
now.
I can only think that a move away from policies of
poverty alleviation, as a result of disappointment with the
sites and services record (ie. lack of cost recovery,
overextended municipal budgets, etc.) is unsound.
In the case of Nairobi, Dandora was undertaken
simultaneous to a coming of age in the life of a city which
had grown rapidly - from 260,000 in 1962 to 1,000,000 twenty
years later.
The institutional mechanisms for city management were
symptomatic of the new demands which an exploding population
engendered. A revolution in the local government's standards
of accountability, efficiency and its breadth of operations
was partially triggered by Dandora and other large shelter
projects. But surely the need for reform in the way the city
conducts its business does not mean a simultaneous avoidance
of the need for poverty alleviation.
The object of the discussion which follows in the nex.t
two chapters is not therefore to determine why the policy of
urban management reforms gained strength (as I have shown they
are a logical outcome of learning from sites and services
projects) but rather to identify why urban management is being
promoted as an alternative to lending for future sites and
services, and other poverty targeted projects. The following
chapter will examine reasons for this "shift and abandon"
pattern of policy evolution inside the World Bank.
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6.0 THEMOVEMENTOF IDEAS: THERISEOF URBAN MANAGEMENT AND
THE -FALL1OF SITES-ND SERVICES?
6.1 Introduction
"But poverty is surely a cause of undefined and
otherwise inadequate public administration...Only a
well-financed government, enrolling well qualified
people, is able to advance its policies and impose
its discipline, negative or affirmative, in
consistent and continuing fashion. So the
quality and characteristics of a government is a
function of the interests of the people by which it
is supported. Poverty is both a cause and
consequence of what Gunnar Myrdal has called the
soft state." (1)
There are a number of reasons which help to explain the
rise of the new urban management lending strategy at the World
Bank. Inadequate public administration or the "soft state" in
developing countries is surely one of them, as Bank experience
with project work has revealed. My analysis of the Bank's
experience with sites and services has shown that the movement
into urban management assistance is an understandable and
important direction. Although this analysis indicates the
evolution of an urban management strategy as a complementary
approach to sites and services, in fact, within the World
Bank, urban management is dominating the swing of policy and
sites and services is on the decline.
lJohn Kenneth Galbraith, The Nature of Povertyq Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, 1979.
145
Some would argue urban management has now taken hold and
sites and services has passed away, although there are urban
staff in the Bank who are still supportive of maintaining the
sites and services approach within the lending program,
strengthened by urban management reforms.
From the overall record of sites and services projects,
and my own evaluation of the Nairobi experience, which has
attempted to sift through the prevailing attitudes and
judgments on the approach, I can only conclude that sites and
services is still potent. Its effectiveness as a model to
reach the poor with low-cost shelter but, moreover, to
alleviate poverty and in fact turn these families around,
constitutes a success-story in the development field which
cannot be denied.
It is not just my evaluation of the Nairobi experience
that acknowledges these successes. The Bank itself identifies
similarly positive results in almost all of its other sites
and services projects around the world - El Salvador and
Zambia being the most exceptional examples. (2) The problems
encountered in these projects are also similar, none
insurmountable and all pointing to the need for strengthening
government administration so as to support the effort.
So why is the Bank, despite its own evaluations,
2 See Douglas H. Keare and Scott Parris, "Evaluation of
Shelter Programs For the Urban Poor: Principal Findings,"
(Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1981.)
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abandoning a good, workable idea which impacts the urban poor
in a positive way ?
The answer which I construct in the following is that
urban projects are being shaped by a larger and more forceful
trend at the Bank. I compile an extensive list of reasons
which explain the rise of urban management lending and then
separate these reasons according to their impact on the sites
and services idea: whether they point to a complementary
lending approach, or they lead to the fall of sites and
services.
6.2 Urban ManaggemetI: Lending for What?
The Bank's management lending policy principally
addresses the administrative capacity of recipient country
governments, both local and urban-related national ministries.
The World Bank includes, under an urban management policy, the
following ingredients: land management, cost recovery, public
sector training and personnel performance; housing finance
and public and private sector housing finance institutions;
infrastructure costs and fees and charges for services;
property tax assessments and management of tax collections;
and, local government budget systems and management. The
World Bank's most recent loan packages are characterized by
inclusion of a number of these components plus infrastructure
investments.
147
For example, in the Third Calcutta Urban Development
Project loan of 1983, out of a total investment program of US
$347.3 million, the technical assistance and training
component is US $4.2 million or about 1 percent. The majority
of the loan, appro'ximately 75 percent, is for city-wide
infrastructure investments, including water supply, drainage,
sanitation and transportation infrastructure. Similarly, a US
$28 million loan to Uganda, was made to provide water supply
and sanitation improvements and technical assistance in seven
major towns. Since 1982, other urban management loans have
been made to Djibouti, Gambia, Guinea, Madagascar, Senegal,
Indonesia, Thailand, Yemen Arab Republic, Brazil and Colombia.
In each, credit was given to strengthen government
institutions and to finance urban infrastructure services.
World Bank loans have also been made to Tunisia, Jamaica and
Peru to improve traffic management (in the case of Jamaica to
assist in privatization of the state-owned transportation
system) and finance infrastructure investment in transport.
(3)
In a conversation with a senior Bank staff member on the
status of this new urban lending program at the Bank, he
stated that the government officials were "in agreement with
the need for urban management improvements in their cities,"
3 For a good summary of these recent World Bank urban
management loans, see "New Directions in Bank Urban Projects,"
UrbanEdge Vol. 9, No. 3 (March, 1985).
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but that they also needed investment funds. He added that,
"for us to leverage urban management changes, we have to also
include cash." As a result, the loans which Urban classifies
as urban management, are predominantly large infrastructure
investments which include components for technical assistance
to improve government administration.
In these loans directed at urban management improvement,
the shelter component appears to be given less importance. In
most cases the technical assistance components are directed at
city-wide urban infrastructure investments.
Compared to the infrastructure investments in the sites
and services projects, which were targeted to a specific low-
income community, the infrastructure investments financed
under the recent urban management loans are largely non-target
specific, servicing the entire city.
The shift to urban management therefore implies a more
basic shift than simply moving from targeting a specific
community to a city-wide level. It is also a shift from
targeted to non-targeted lending, the urban poor being the
original focus.
It is difficult to measure the fallout from this, but
given the "leakage of benefits" on the earlier targeted
projects (for example, 15 percent of the benefits from the
Dandora project is estimated to have trickled-up to higher-
income beneficiaries), one might speculate that in the non-
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targeted lending, the benefits may be skewed even more
favorably towards the higher- income range.
In addition, this trickle-up might also be expected, due
to the impossibility of close monitoring of such large
investments. Whereas in sites and services lending, the loan
was directed through one institution allowing fairly close
monitoring, these new urban management loans are directed
through a large number of existing and new institutions across
a number of municipalities. One might expect, therefore, that
the current non-targeted- lending characteristic of urban
manaqement will benefit those of higher income in the
cities.(4)
Employment of unskilled and semi-skilled labor can also
be expected to suffer. Whereas in sites and services
projects, small scale enterprises were encouraged to
participate both in services installation and room additions,
there is a tendency towards large firms and centralized
contracting in these large citywide infrastructure investments
under urban management loans. The impacts of urban management
lending on the urban poor can be expected to be less for these
three reasons.
4 This two-tiered issue is drawn on from a conversation
with Bish Sanyal at M.I.T.
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6.3 The Rise of Urban Management_ s _ Comp1emegnt To Sites And
Services
6.3.1 Introduction
The reasons which help to explain the rise of the new
urban management lending strategy at the World Bank are
divided here between (1) those which emerged from the Bank's
experience with a decade of lending for sites and services and
(2) others which I call "tangential movements."
These reasons offer a logical progression for the Bank's
move towards the urban management lending strategy. Indeed,
in the first section, I will argue that the Bank's experience
indicates a very positive learning path which has taken its
urban lending into the management issues of development. More
importantly, the reasons given in this section for the rise of
urban management do not indicate any need for urban management
to replace sites and services lending. In fact, the reasoning
here supports a complementary approach for the Bank in its
lending practices, namely, sites and services in tandem with
urban management.
6.3.2 Lessons from Sites and Services Project Experience
The fact that the urban program at the Bank is shifting
its sights to a broader city-wide lending focus can definitely
be argued from an experiential basis. Learning from the
experience of over ten years of lending for more than 60 sites
and services projects, is one factor driving this shift in the
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urban lending focus towards urban management. It cannot be
considered the only reason since similar shifts to management
concerns can be found across other sectors at the Bank. The
impact of project evaluations does, however, help to explain
this shift in part.
The Bank evaluations being referred to here are distinct
from the project-by-project reviews which were more concerned
with city-specific, fine-tuning of procedural aspects. After
nearly a decade of such operations, Urban staff undertook a
series of more broadly based reviews of sites and services
projects both on a case-by-case basis as well as at a more
programmatic level. (5)
Instead of focussing on specific problems of the
projects, a broader line of questioning was pursued which
attempted to understand the impact of the lending program to
date on the cities of the Third World, whether sites and
services as a model was being replicated, and whether the
package as a whole made sense in the environment of the cities
of developing nations which the Urban staff had now become
familiar with.
In the following, I will discuss what can be termed
"learning by evaluation" which has contributed, in a positive
5 For example, see Michael Cohen's Learning_ByDoing,
(The World Bank, 1983); and Douglas Keare and Scott Parris,
Evaluation ofShelterProgEams_for the Urban Poor: Pr incipag1
Findings (The World Bank, 1982); and, Michael Bamberger,
Bishwapura Sanyal and Nelson Valverde, "Evaluation and
Services Projects: The Experience from Lusaka, Zambia,"
World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 548 (1982).
152
fashion, to this shifting focus in the urban lending program
at the Bank.
(a) Lessons About City-Wide Payment For Services
The evaluations of sites and services projects have, in
general, indicated a need to look city-wide rather than
consider a specific sites and services project site as a
community in isolation.
For example, one senior Bank officer who began his career
with sites and services at the Bank, stated that, "we made the
error of identifying a group of citizens to pay for services
in our projects when across the road, no one was paying. We
know now that we must look city-wide to determine the system
of payment and ask: how many out of the total population are
paying?"
This is one important lesson emerging from the Bank's
experience with sites and services assistance. The task in
addressing this problem, however, was a large undertaking. In
general, the cities in which the Bank was involved showed that
tariffs and charges for the provision of water, sewerage and
drainage services were not being enforced. Hence, very few
urban residents out of the total were paying for services.
Consequently, the Bank cited poor financial management in
the cities as the cause for failure to collect charges for
infrastructure services, and called for a city-wide system of
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rates, user-fees, charges and management training on
collection systems for city services.
This tactic replaced the previous pattern of attempting
to enforce an orderly system of payments for services in a
small-enclave, surrounded by an entire city that was somehow
exempt from the same rigorous procedures. The experience with
problems of recovering costs of urban services in sites and
services projects therefore formed the basis of an evolution
to a city-wide focus on urban management relative to the
collection of payments.
Lending for urban development is now tied to various
urban management improvements in this area. For example, in
the Bank's negotiations for the third Calcutta loan, the
Calcutta Metropolitan Corporation (CMC) agreed to reduce the
resource gap (6) and to collect revenues at not less than the
following percentages of its revenue expenditure for the water
supply operations: 1983/84 - 48%; 1984/85 - 63%; 1985/86 -
87%. In addition, as a condition of "loan effectiveness", CMC
agreed to increase the water rates for metered non-domestic
users and introduce a graduated rate for domestic unmetered
users. Similar agreements were reached with the Calcutta
Metropolitan Water and Sanitation Authority (CMWSA).
6 The resource gap is defined by the Bank as the
difference between internally generated revenue receipts and
revenue expenditures, in its 1983 appraisal for the Third
Calcutta Urban Development Project.
154
(b) Lessons About Installing Residential Services
The experience with installation of infrastructure for
sites and services projects also indicated a need to look
city-wide in the actual investments. The Bank has argued for
example that they have learned that the installation of a
trunk sewer system for a specific project needs to be
considered within the entire city network which may also need
improvement and additions.
Recent loans by the Bank therefore focus heavily on city
wide water supply, drainage and sanitation investments. The
context of Bank urban lendinq has therefore changed from a
6,000 household community in a sites and services project,
targeted to approximately 48,000 poor people, to a non-
targeted loan, which would serve the city's population as a
whole through city-wide infrastructure provision. The Bank
loan to Calcutta in 1983, for example, disbursed over $150
million for water supply, drainage and sanitation investment
across 37 municipalities in the Calcutta Metropolitan Area.
(c) Lessons About Cost Recovery
The Bank's evaluations have also indicated a serious cost
recovery problem on almost all of the sites and services
projects.(7) Given that cost recovery was cited as one of the
7 The El Salvador sites and services project is often
cited in Bank evaluations as the exception to the cost
recovery record. The project was executed by a foundation
outside the government -the Fundacion Salvadorena de
Desarrollo y Vivienda Minima (FSDVM). Bank evaluators (Keare
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basic tenets in the program, its failure is a major cause for
the Bank to view the projects in general as problematic. This
negative experience with cost recovery has, contributed to the
rise of the urban management lending strategy, in that the
Bank has interpretted the problem of cost recovery as an
administrative problem, having managerial solutions.
One focus in new urban management-style loans is to
establish a municipal management training program, and, often
to set up program units in the national governments to manage
and monitor urban development programs and give guidance to
local authorities in budgeting and planning. For example, in
a recently appraised urban project in Zimbabwe, the Bank's
loan would support an on-the-job training program for
community services staff in charge of collection of tariffs
and payments; project management; revenue clerks in charge
of bookkeeping collections and receipts; accounting
technicians, and treasury staff.
Cost recovery problems in the sites and services projects
have, in this way, helped to direct the new focus being taken
at the Bank on urban management. Collection systems in an
and Parris, 1981) state that the excellent cost recovery
record is due to the non-profit status of FSDVM which requires
it to recover costs in order to remain operative, as well as
to the high level of social responsibility assumed by project
participants in project implementation. The FSDVM has a
collection system which is computerized for monitoring
payments and uses incentives and penalties and visits by
lawyers for households in arrears. In addition, the fact that
the project is small enough to supervise financial problems
closely, contributes to its success with cost recovery.
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administrative sense were poor, as seen in the case of Nairobi
and illustrated in the preceding chapter. However, one might
ask why these collection methods were not in place or, if in
place, were poorly functioning since revenue to governments
would in general be a matter of self-interest.
I believe the explanation for this pattern of non-
collection can be linked to the overriding political context
of publicly supplied services. This reality has largely been
ignored in the Bank's discussions on cost recovery.
The "technocratic fix" being applied to the problem (i.e.
fix the administration, infuse technical systems for
collections into the governments and people will start paying
and qovernments will start collecting) ignores a set of
expectations between governments and their constituents(8) on
the provision of housing, land and services. (I have
discussed this at more length in Chapter 5: Section 5.3).
What this means in the context of the discussion here is
that, although lessons from experience with cost recovery from
sites and services projects are in part directing this shift
towards urban management, the application of urban management
solutions to problems which are political in nature,
represents a misdirected response. Consequently, urban
management will eventually be seen as failing to fulfill its
promise. At this point one can begin to understand that the
8 From comments received from Lisa Peattie at M.I.T., on
this paper.
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shift to urban management can only partially be attributed to
the experience gained from sites and services. The other
motives for its application need to be seen as part of a
larger organizational trend. This I map out more explicitly
in the latter half of this chapter.
The revenue problems caused by the poor cost recovery
record has also contributed to a new concentration, as part of
the urban management program, on resource mobilization and
revenue generating mechanisms. For example, property tax
assessments and collections are central components of the
Bank's Third Calcutta Urban Development Project. The project
emphasizes legislative and administrative changes so as to
maximize property tax revenues. As part of the Bank loan,
agreement was reached that a general reevaluation of
properties in the Calcutta Metropolitan Area will be carried
out in those localities where the assessment has been deemed
too low. It is the Bank's belief that a revalued property tax
base will provide a revenue base for the local government
which, even if cost recovery remains weak for other on-going
political reasons, at least the local government can remain
operative and repay its loans.
(d) Lessons About "Facilitating" and
Implementing Shelter Projects
The evaluations also contributed to an understanding,
very often repeated in my interviews with the Bank Urban
staff, that sites and services projects were "really just a
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drop in the bucket". The argument was usually presented in
terms of an original target, for instance, of reaching 5,000
households when the demand in that year was actually 20,000.
By the time the project was completed, the demand was over
fivefold as a result of the rapid city growth.
This experience, according to the staff, dictated a
review of the effectiveness of sites and services as an
approach, and also a move to look at the systemic features for
Urban as a whole, how to facilitate the shelter process to
better meet this rapid growth in demand for urban housing.
Such a review, they stated, led into urban management concerns
- what the public sector could be doing better to facilitate
efficient urban development.
This particular story of the shifting focus sounds right,
but, in stopping to consider it more closely, one would have
to say, well, of course the projects were a drop in the
bucket, they were really only meant as demonstration projects
in the first place. The real issue is the fact that the
governments are not replicating the projects on their own. As
I argued above, it may be too early to tell whether or not
governments will replicate since many of these projects are
only just being completed in the mid-1980's. I stated that
the constraints on replicability included in part a lack of
political will which derives from the strained relationship
between the local politicians and the special project staff
controlling the execution of the project; a lack of funding
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to repeat the task; and, problems of implementation in terms
of administrative capacity necessary to repeat the projects.
It is the latter set of problems that the Bank staff cite as
leading to urban management, that is, the need to address
implementation, administrative improvements and financial
management of local governments.
(e) An Obvious But Important Lesson:
"Urban" As More Than Just Shelter
Finally, one reason for the reorientation of the Bank's
lending strategy towards urban management, which derived from
the staff's experience with sites and services projects, was
the project staffs' realization that in doing one housing
project, other urban problems were escalating and going
unnoticed. As one former project officer stated, "In Niqeria
you can't help opening your eyes, housing does not solve the
larger water need facing the city as a whole. Then you start
analyzing other bottlenecks, and soon you are seeing beyond
housing from an urban viewpoint."
Compared to 1972 when the World Bank first initiated an
urban lending program with a special emphasis on shelter, now,
"urban" is being defined in more typical and expected terms,
and other urban issues such as transport, infrastructure and
finance are being included in the program. Hence, the
evaluations of sites and services projects seem to have
questioned the entire nature of urban lending as it was being
focused upon at the Bank.
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The establishment of the Urban Division in the early
1970's appears now, in retrospect, to have been developed and
defined around the central issue of housing. Shelter and
shelter-related services constituted the largest portion of
the urban lending portfolio. Between 1972 and 1981, Bank
loans were made for 36 shelter projects, compared to only 10
transport loans which were largely made in the latter half of
this 10 year lending period.
In part, this emphasis was due to the fact that, in this
period of the 1970's, international concern and awareness for
shelter had escalated. People were starting to focus
attention on the housing problems of the Third World urban
poor. This, coupled with the concern in the Bank to target
lending to the poor in accordance with President McNamara's
policy speeches, led to the orientation of the new urban
program at the Bank which had shelter as its focus. Shelter
also had a high profile in terms of international assistance.
Assisting the poor with housing was a more obvious and overt
signal than, for example, assisting water supply.
In general, housing is an easy thing to identify as being
inadequate. Everyone is in agreement that housing looks bad
or is undersupplied in most Third World cities. In that era
of attacking poverty and addressing basic needs it was easier
to target housing as inadequate and to propose a concrete
product as a solution. Addressing governments as inadequate,
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that is, giving assistance for urban management in the 1970's,
was just not possible.
6.3.3 Tangential Movements
Given the above discussion, the Bank's experience with
sites and services can be seen as driving this shift to urban
management. Many of the lessons derived from the Bank staff's
experience I argue to have been a very positive learning path,
leading to an evolving awareness of the need to address the
management aspects of a city's development.
However, the Bank staff cited other sectors besides Urban
at the Bank that were also shifting to an emphasis on
management. An increasing emphasis on privatization,
management, credit programs and government administration was
cited across other sectors at the Bank, including rural,
education, industry and health. This indicates to me, a broad
set of movements inside the Bank which are directing this new
orientation, for reasons which go beyond informed learning
from the evaluations of sites and services projects. I call
these broader pressures: "tangential movements", as they are
neither central to the urban project experience nor do they
emanate from the urban-related departments in the Bank.
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(a) The Movement Towards Sector Adjustment Lending
One movement which has contributed to the rise of urban
management is the swing into sector adjustment loans at the
World Bank.
The Bank's identity evolved as an organization which lent
for projects. Since 1945, about 90 percent of the Bank's loan
commitments have been for specific projects. Since about
1980, however, the Bank's lending has become more policy-
based. Policy-based lending accounted for about half of the
Bank's new loan commitments in 1985. Project lending has been
declining and by 1986, accounted for 50 percent of total new
Bank commitments.(9)
In sector adjustment lending, the Bank loans to one
specific part of the economy (in contrast to the IMF's
structural adjustment lending which addresses economy-wide
policy changes (10)) seeking policy changes in that particular
sector such as changes in rate structure, tax reform and other
economic policy reforms which will improve productivity and
growth in the sector.
In part, sector adjustment lending has arisen from the
international debt crisis. A.W. Clausen wrote an article in
9 Overseas Development Council, Between Two Worlds:
The World Bank's Next Decade (edited by Richard Feinberg,
1986).
10 Although the World Bank has recently been making
structural adjustment loans as well (IBID).
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the New York Times in 1983, arguing that the World Bank and
others must increase their lending to the indebted nations (a
counter argument to the popular cries of the time of "Don't
bail out the banks"). Clausen cited changes in the Bank's
lending as including: "a larger proportion of the Bank's
lending to structural reforms; supporting sectors where
productive capacity can be better used; and, giving special
priority to certain high-yielding projects at the expense of
others..."(11)
Thus, one of the key responses to the debt crisis in the
1980's has been to pump more money into the most indebted
nations. The Baker initiative, for example, in 1985 called
for the increase in commercial bank lending to the 15 most
heavily indebted nations of $20 billion, over three years,
together with an increase of $9 billion by the multilateral
institutions, to be led by the World Bank.
Lending more has meant changing the types of loans. The
search for creditworthy projects to lend to, has been well
documented as a scarce commodity. (12) An increase in sector
lending as opposed to project lending has eased part of this
need to move greater sums of money.
11 A. W. Clausen. "To Help Developing Counties Sustain
Growth," NewYork Times, February 22, 1983.
12 Judith Tendler. InsideForeignAid. 1975.
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Unlike project lending which is slow and burdensome,
sector lending is generally believed to be faster and also
easier to disburse. With sites and services projects, loans
are disbursed slowly over the course of construction. As seen
in the Dandora project, delays in construction also meant
delays in Bank disbursement of the total loan committed.
Although sector adjustment lending is also delivered in
tranches, policy-based loans would tend to get through the
pipeline faster. In the case of urban management, this may
prove not to be the case. Indeed, given the delays seen in
the infrastructure investment for the new and relatively small
community in Nairobi, city-wide investments in infrastructure
may be even harder to speed along and keep co-ordinated
without running into worse delays.
Moreover, sector lending can move greater sums of money
than individual project loans. For example, the 1983 urban
development loan to Calcutta amounted to $147 million and the
1984 loan to Zimbabwe for urban development was $43 million.
The typical sites and services project loan in the 1970's was
usually in the area of $14 million. These larger sector loans
are being disbursed over five years, whereas, the sites and
services loans were generally disbursed over 7 to 8 years.
This broader Bank movement into sector adjustment lending
which resulted from external forces related to the debt crisis
and the consequent need to move greater sums of money to
developing countries, has put pressure on Urban to also lend
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more money than its previous project lending could
accommodate. Therefore, just as project experience was being
evaluated which offered lessons on the need to improve
institutional capability and look more city-wide in the
provision of infrastructure, Urban also came under pressure to
advance its lending strategy into sectoral adjustment style
loans. To debate which came first is not very helpful, it is
sufficient to recognize that both pressures were realistic and
that converging trends have contributed to this shift towards
urban management at the Bank.
This pressure to lend greater sums of money, faster,
contributes to the rise of urban management but does not
necessarily lead to a conclusion to drop sites and services
project lending. In fact, in those countries with sites and
services project experience, lending could be expanded,
opening up larger serviced sites in conjunction with urban
management improvements identified from earlier project
experience.
If however, as seemingly is the case now, sites and
services are being dropped from the urban lending program,
then it must be recognized that this and other pressures
within the Bank override this more innocent view being cited
by the staff of lessons and experience directing the new urban
management loans.
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(b) The Movement To Link Urban To The Macroeconomy
A further reason contributing to the rise of urban
management at the World Bank, also stems from international
financial pressure. The 1980's have registered poor economic
performance in the developing countries. With the exception
of East Asia and the Pacific countries, whose economies have
continued to grow at healthy rates, the rest of the developing
countries - Latin America and the Caribbean, North Africa and
the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa - experienced declining
per capita incomes during the 1980's. In 1981, growth in per
capita GNP for all developing countries including East Asia
and the Pacific, was only 0.2 percent (13). This indicates a
sizeable number of developing countries experienced negative
growth, including countries in Latin America and Sub-Saharan
Africa.
The heightened concern with national economic growth in
the 1980's contributed to a movement to link the role of
cities and towns to a country's economic growth. Interest
at the Bank in addressing the interdependence between urban
and macroeconomic policies has just developed in the past few
years. For example, in 1985, the Bank began to cite
statistics like: "cities generate more than 50 percent of
gross domestic product (GDP) in most developing countries,"
and other statements along the same lines: "the future
13 World Bank, WorldBankAnnualReport, 1982, p. 25.
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economic growth of our countries depends critically on the
smooth functioning of cities" and "inefficient urban
management has macro-economic implications, as cities such as
Lagos and Cairo demonstrate." (14)
In building this relationship between urban efficiency
and national economic growth, urban management gained momentum
as the means to increase urban productivity. This movement to
establish macro-economic linkages again, however, does not
signal any reason for sites and services project lending to be
abandoned. On the contrary, the analysis of sites and
services projects in the previous chapter indicates the
ability of the Bank's loans, through project implementation,
to improve urban management capability and build-up
institutional frameworks in a city for further urban
operations.
In part, it should be added that this movement to develop
linkages of urban to the macroeconomy also resulted from the
new pressures facing the Urban Division once it was
regionalized into separate project divisions throughout the
Bank. This will be discussed in the following section. In
that context, however, this movement would signal the
abandonment of sites and services.
14 "New Directions in Bank Urban Projects," UrbanEdge,
9,3 (March 1985).
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6.4 TheRiseOfUrbanManagementnd The Fall Of Sites And
S e rvi c e
6.4.1. Introduction
Distinct from the above discussion, there are a number of
reasons
for the rise of urban management at the Bank which also mean
the fall of sites and services. These I categorize as
organizational factors internal to the World Bank and other,
once again, "tangential movements."
6.4.2 Organizational Reasons Inside the World Bank
(a) Regionalizing the Urban Project staff
The process of regionalization at the Bank has been
critical to this movement of ideas. The Urban Projects
Department started to be regionalized in 1981. The project
staff were separated into six regional divisions and the Urban
Policy staff became part of the Operations Policy Staff (OPS)
at the Bank. The Urban project staff split-up across six
regional divisions at the Bank, physically separated by
differing buildings in Washington. Within each regional
office, there are two departments, a country programs
department and a projects department. The projects department
in each region is divided sectorally with Urban being created
as a sub-division within each region. (See Diagram below)
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SAMPLE WORLD BANK REGIONAL OFFICE - ORG6NIZATIONL CHART
(1985)_(15)
The Bank has a history of nurturing new programs like
Urban within its own separate department, and then, once
experience is gained, the department is regionalized. What
regionalization meant for the Urban Projects Department in
effect, was that the staff of the sites and services program
were no longer in their own "safe" department. Urban project
15 This diagram is specific to the organizational
structure of the regional divisions. For a full
organizational chart of the World Bank, refer to Appendix B.
At this time of writing, the World Bank is undergoing another
reorganization which will affect the way the regional offices
are structured, as depicted here.
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staff found themselves having to deal with the water and
infrastructure staff of other project divisions which had
already been assigned to regional departments (and hence who
had already carved out a place for themselves in the
department) as well as the staff of other large sectors
including industrial development, agriculture, transportation
and energy.
Each region received the urban projects in different
ways, often cited by the staff as dependent upon the view of
urban issues held by the Regional Vice-President and the
Projects Department Director. As one urban project officer
described their reception into the regional office: "We were
under extremely close supervision from our Regional Director
for several years...He felt that he had to discipline Urban -
we were dreamers to him."
At the time Urban was reviewing its own past operations
and questioning the effectiveness of sites and services versus
a broader urban lending program, the process of being
regionalized put further pressure on Urban to become more
effective as a sector relative to the other, traditionally
more productive sectors at the Bank. Again therefore, an
issue of timing and convergence of events affects the life of
the idea and its tendency to fall or rise.
The result of this organizational restructuring was that
the Urban staff had to become more conscious of speed and
efficiency in their lending program - to look more efficient
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relative to the other sectors. As one of the Urban staff
stated, our "spotty record' with sites and services did not
make Lis very competitive in Bank terms... at the same time we
were evaluating our past experience, Urban came under pressure
(from regionalization) to get our act together - to look and
be more efficient." In a discussion with another Urban
projects staff member on the effect of regionalization on the
sites and services program, an example of this pressure was
cited: "We had to become more efficient vis-a-vis other
sectors once regionalized. For example, it took us 180 staff
weeks for board presentation on a sites and services project -
other sectors were averaging 75. We had to change our ways
of doing business."
The shift to urban management was discussed by one
project officer as "being able to get more project for the
dollar" which was also perceived as a good thing within the
regions. He stated for example, that "city wide projects were
better" than shelter and that "the hot issue now is projects
having broad impacts and a specific contribution to the
macroeconomy". Along the same lines, another staff member
stated that, unlike shelter, "rehabilitation of roads and
infrastructure give higher rates of return" and have a "direct
link to national economic growth."
This sentiment reflects an on-going debate on the subject
of housing as a non-productive versus a productive investment.
The "housing as non-productive" advocates argue that,
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investment in housing is longer term, unlike investment in a
factory for example which offers more immediate returns in the
generation of national income. Residential construction has a
long capital recapture period and, hence, particularly in
developing countries where capital is scarce, it is argued
that resources should be channelled into sectors having more
rapid returns on investment.
On the other hand, the "housing as productive" advocates
would argue that housing encourages savings and that
investment in housing will provide an incentive to save for
previously non-saving members of society.(16) Similarly,
investment in housing is argued to generate employment, both
on and off-site. In other words, residential construction is
not only a large generator of direct employment opportunities,
but there are backward and forward linkages which promote
growth and employment in other sectors. Examples of such
backward and forward linkages would be, respectively, in the
materials industry, and in residential-related industries such
as appliances and other durable goods.
Shelter can be thought of in the framework of this
debate, or it is often removed from this framework entirely
and couched instead as a basic human need. Because the debate
over the productivity of housing investment is not resolved,
and this other "need" aspect of housing has been declining in
16 Bertrand Renaud, "Financing Shelter," World Bank
Discussion Paper (November, 1985)
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emphasis as the overall poverty focus in aid is shifting,
shelter issues within the regional offices were felt to be on
shaky ground. As the sites and services project officer
stated, infrastructure investments are easier to link to
national economic growth. In these terms, sites and services
suffered in the regions once cast into this competitive
situation vis-a-vis other sectors. Whereas urban management
activities and a broader city-wide lending program for
infrastructure were seen as more appropriate in this new
environment.
To some of the Urban staff, regionalization was referred
to as "Urban being cast into a hostile environment." This
feeling was generated from not only having to be competitive
with other project divisions like Industry and Agriculture in
the Projects Department, but also with the Country Programs
Department in the regional offices.
Country Program Departments are involved, predictably
enough, in country programming and national economic policy
reform which in effect shape the lending portfolios at the
Bank for each region. The program divisions are chiefly '
staffed with macroeconomic planners and are regarded within
the divisions as entities distinct from the project
departments. One urban projects staff member in describing
this relationship stated that "the program divisions control
the budget, in other words they control the projects
departments." Another staff member defined the relationship
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between projects and programs departments in the regions as
competitive and problematic but for reasons more related to a
different disciplinary approach in their staff's work. One
senior Water Supply and Urban Development Department member
stated, in reference to the macroeconomists in the program
divisions and their view of Urban:
"These macroeconomists are trained at Harvard and
the London School of Economics where "urban" is
never mentioned, or only as a bottomless pit. But
cities are largely responsible for a country's
productivity. The urban inefficiencies of Cairo are
responsible for Egypt's deficiencies."
The fact that Urban was not a priority sector was obviously
felt more once Urban was split up into the regions,
particularly with Urban getting only about 5 percent of the
World Bank's overall budget. The view that Urban had been
"cast into a hostile environment" with regionalization, I
understand to mean having to be more competitive with other
project sectors on the one hand, and with the country program
macroeconomists on the other. As one of the Urban project
staff members argued, "we are now in a bad situation, we not
only have to go out and convince governments of the importance
of an urban project like sites and services, but then we have
to come back and convince the Bank."
In this new setting for the urban project staff, that
they themselves described as "hostile" and "less secure"
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within the regional offices, the tendency to move on to a new
lending strategy I would think is strong. The "spotty record"
of sites and services projects and their inefficiencies
relative to other projects in terms of staff weeks in the
project cycle, causes pressure to abandon the approach and
latch on to the new urban management strategy that is on the
rise. Also, the inclusion of a sites and services project in
an urban management package may be left to the discretion of
the division chief. As one staff member stated, if the
division chief has a history with sites and services, it may
be added in, if his interest is in water or transport, then
these will often replace housing in the loan package. The
staff that supported a continuance of sites and services
stated that their role was to convince the regional chief of
the merits of their post-project work.
(b) The Fall from Grace of Demonstration Projects
The Bank's evaluations of sites and services are critical
of the fact that the projects, set up as demonstration
projects, are not being replicated by governments on their
own. This perception, or judgement, together with the fact
that, according to one staff member, "Bank management was
getting tired of demonstration projects," has contributed to
the shift towards urban management, away from sites and
services.
176
This awareness of "demonstration projects getting worn
out" was cited by one urban projects officer who stated that
questions within the Bank were being raised, asking "why are
we always financing demonstration projects instead of real,
ongoing projects?" He added that the message to the Urban
staff was clear: the World Bank "would not continue taking
the next step to finance demonstration projects like sites and
services."
The influence of this turn away from demonstration
projects within the Bank generally, gave further momentum to
the shift being taken in urban towards a new management
lending strategy, while also signalling the fall from grace of
sites and services project lending. It became increasingly
evident to Urban that within the Bank, "there was not enough
money behind the plans to keep doing sites and services
projects," given the perceptions that the demonstration
projects were not successfully being replicated by
governments.
This reason, (the fall from grace of demonstration
projects) at face value does help to explain a kind of
fuelling in the rise of urban management as an alternative to
demonstration projects and, consequently, the fall of sites
and services. However, it may be too early to judge the
future of replicability and the impacts of the Bank's lending
for sites and services demonstration projects. As stated at
the outset of this study, there were government officials who
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were beginning to revise their sights and see the value of the
sites and services approach to their shelter problems.
Perhaps the project evaluations are wrong in saying sites
and services are not replicating. In the Nairobi case
examined here, the sites and services approach was becoming
acceptable to the local government and had already been made
official policy within the Kenyan government and is embodied
in the current Five Year Plan. It may also be a question of
money that the projects are not being replicated. But based on
the Nairobi projects examined, it is more a question of time,
ie., the projects are not replicating yet. The Nairobi City
Commission could not possibly have started up its own sites
and services projects given the number of externally assisted
sites and services projects already in the pipeline. At the
time of my observation of the projects in 1983 and 1984, the
Housing Development Department had just completed Dandora, had
work in progress on Kayole, had just completed UMOJA I, and at
the time was gearing up for UMOJA II.
The manpower requirements alone made it impossible for
the Government to even consider beginning its own projects.
Besides, why would they divert their own budgets away from
other funding to finance sites and services when international
assistance was flowing in? The only time to judge the
replicability of sites and services will be once the dust
settles and international assistance for the projects has died
away. But even then, new lending for urban management and the
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often related large urban infrastructure investments may keep
governments from replicating sites and services. In this way
also, this shift in lending by the Bank acts diverts
governments from replicating the projects, and, more
importantly, diverts these governments'attention away from the
urban poor.
(c) Projects People Versus Policies People
When the Urban Projects Department was regionalized, the
project staff were split off into the projects departments of
each of the six regional offices. The policy staff, however,
remained within the Water Supply and Urban Development
Department (WUD) as part of the Operations Policy Staff (OPS).
(17)
Relations between the Urban policy staff in OPS and the
Urban project staff in the regions were strained. When I
spoke to policy staff members in the OPS Water Supply and
Urban Development Department, they described their role vis a
vis the projects staff as "senior advisory talent" at the Bank
who "review and support urban officers in the regions." In my
discussions with the urban project staff, however, the OPS
role was described as "advisory in principle but
17 The position of the Water Supply and Urban Development
Department (WUD) as part of the Operations Policy Staff (OPS)
is indicated in the World Bank's organizational chart in
Appendix C.
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interventionist in practice." The urban projects staff are
directly responsible to their division chiefs, not to the OPS
staff. The main contact between the Urban project staff and
OPS is in the review process at appraisal, which was described
by one project officer as "coming too late ... OFS is just
another bureaucratic step in an already bureaucratic
structure." The complaints about OPS from the Urban project
staff were cited as including: "they come in at the last-
minute when they haven't seen the background, particularly all
the bargaining with governments which has gone on" and "they
do not understand our pressures in projects, they are too
theoretical".
Apart from these battle lines, there appears to be a more
substantive split between the project staff and the OPS staff.
Much of the impetus for the shift away from sites and services
into urban management is described by project staff as coming
from the Operations Policy Staff. The project learning in the
divisions is completely separate from a broader-style policy
learning in the OPS Department. This is, in part, due to the
policy staff having more distance from day to day procedural
aspects of project design and implementation. It is also due
to their capacity (and assignment) to do research and reflect
on the broader issues of field learning.
It appears, however, from conversations with both groups
of people, that the hostility or battle lines as they have
been drawn since regionalization, prevents any convergence
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between what might be called a "dual track learning" (18)
which has evolved since regionalization. The projects are
generating specific field informed experience in the regions
while the OPS staff are considering policy from a very
separate place in the organization and are accused by the
project staff of being too theoretical. Questions as to who
is learning from the evaluations, and, how effective are they
when there is no good link between the projects and policy
staff, is an organizational question which the Bank must
address. (19)
More important to this study, however, is the very
different vantage points of the two groups in terms of the
movement of ideas within the Bank. The Urban project staff,
simply by nature of their close work with sites and services
projects, develop loyalties to the idea and as a result, are
less willing to abandon the approach. Indeed, they are much
more committed to the on-going development of lending which
can help to improve sites and services project implementation.
In my discussions with them, they argued that urban management
18 Lloyd S. Etheredge, CanGovernments Learn?_American
EggignFlic-ygad Cet-alAmericanRevolutions, New York:
Pergamon Press, 1985) refers to "dual track" information
processing in American foreign policy decisions. The term is
borrowed here to refer to a separate learning path I am
identifying between "projects versus policies people" within
the World Bank.
19 At the time of this writing, there is a review of
organizational restructuring being conducted which may enlarge
further this gap between project and policies people at the
Bank.
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lending is necessary. I found it difficult to sort out what
was rhetoric, that is, were they saying positive things about
urban management because they saw the tide turning at the Bank
and knew their futures were to be linked closely with it? The
experience of the Urban staff at the Bank working on the
Dandora project clarified this. The problems I had seen in
Nairobi, they argued could be improved upon by further urban
management lending. This, in fact, was true to a large
degree. In the Nairobi case, urban management lending could
be directed at streamlining a process of approvals for shelter
and urban development in general. The overlapping committee
approvals process was in need of management review. The
problems of cost recovery, both in the shelter projects and
across the city in collection of water and sewage rates needed
to be addressed, especially in light of the Nairobi City
Council's dire financial situation. Property tax revenues
needed to be raised so that the Nairobi City Council could
function more independently of the Government of Kenya.
In general, from these interviews, I found that the Urban
project staff were supportive of urban management because they
were committed to making sites and services projects work.
Many of the staff I interviewed were pioneers of sites and
services projects and, although many had moved on and been
promoted upward through the Bank bureaucracy, still expressed
a very strong loyalty to the idea of sites and services.
Pioneering the idea in the field, making it operational, meant
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also developing strong loyalties to the approach. From
conversations with the policy staff, it was also clear that
they were not as committed to sites and services as the
projects staff, again in part for reasons of distance from the
actual day to day workings of getting these projects built.
Both because of their "higher level" review of project
evaluations and their lesser commitment to the projects by
nature of their place in the bureaucracy, there is a tendency
for the policy staff to more readily abandon the approach to
sites and services. This tendency might also be symptomatic
of the nature of policy work in general.
Given the field of development that policy staff are
concerned with, characteristic both of problems with past
lending and uncertain future paths to be taken in assisting
the development process, there is a continual search for new
points of approach, for panaceas, for new directions, and new
knowledge. Movements arise more easily in this realm and
hence decisions to abandon earlier ideas are more readily and
easily taken. This is particularly true when considering the
more detached position of policy staff vis a vis the project
staff who are more committed to making the idea work. The
project staff seem to be more attuned to plugging away, making
their projects work better, whereas the policy staff are able
to move on, putting one set of tried policies or an approach
behind them that was really only viewed in an abstract way to
begin with.
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In this way, a shift to urban management lending away
from sites and services projects is understandable at the
level of policy thinking within the Bank. The influence of
the OPS Urban staff in promoting an urban management lending
strategy helps to also explain why, despite the commitment of
project staff to the approach, sites and services is falling
in popularity at the Bank.
At a more general level, the "shift and abandon" pattern
of policy evolution which I am tracking in this study, seems
in part therefore to be a function of a specific
organizational structure which distances "policies peoiple"
from "projects people." This has become evident from my
interviews with both groups in the World Bank. Currently,
there is another reorganization occuring within the Bank which
could further enlarge this gap, and hence impact even more the
tendency of policies to shift, causing "old" ideas to be
abandoned, irregardless of soundness and experience.
(d) Lending For A Product
In the urban lending program, when Urban was first being
added as a sector of its own within the long bureaucratic
structure at the Bank, the "Urban Pioneers" were faced with a
need to develop a product and create a specific task
environment for urban officers to fit into, and in conjunction
with the overriding scheme at the Bank. Sites and services
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fit well: a beginning and an end could be easily mapped out in
a project life cycle. Other urban projects could fit just as
well in this sense such as water, sewerage, or transportation.
Shelter, however, as I argued earlier, fit better in the other
sense as a more overt signal of assisting the poor, an
important consideration in that era of heightened
international attention on shelter conditions of the poor and
poverty alleviating development assistance.
The organizational need for a product helps to explain
some of the basic tenets of the Bank's sites and services
program. For example, the need to insulate the projects from
politics was understandable from the point of view of the Bank
officers who needed to define a beginning and end point both
in terms of time and in terms of end result. For instance,
the task was shaped not so much to assist a process that was
tied up with politics, but rather to avoid to as great an
extent as possible that process, in order to solve a specific
problem, for a specific constituency by providing a "clean"
product - 6,0)O serviced sites with cores, for example.
To deliver this product, however, required on-going
attention. Hence the creation of special project units to
ensure execution and in essence, fulfillment of this
organizational need for a product. Hence the building in of
regulations and deadlines to ensure that the product
materialized on time and was on par with some pre-conceived
notion of what it was to look like.
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Sites and services turned out to be much less a product
or specific problem solving task. These projects turned out
always to be bound up with a whole array of other problems,
political issues and competing constituencies. Implementation
required addressing an entire process, involving local and
national government bureaucrats, politicians, project
administration, private entrepreneurs, low and middle-income
users, building groups, welfare groups, etc.
Urban management lending, however, despite the
description of it as addressing broader systemic issues and
which by first impressions is more a process, policy style of
lending, may in fact be more product oriented for the Bank
than sites and services projects. The large infrastructure
investments, the technical assistance studies, property tax
valuations, etc. are producing "tangibles" in the Bank's eyes.
6.4.3 Tangential Movements
Apart from the above organizational reasons which I argue
are contributing to both the rise of urban management and the
fall of sites and services as an idea in good currency, there
are broader trends and issues which also impact this movement.
These include what I call "Big Mood Swings" and "Personality
Changes". I trace here, the impact of each on the rise of the
urban management lending strategy and the concomitant fall of
sites and services.
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(a) "Big Mood Swings"
If one asked; "Why give aid in the 1970's" and compared
the response to the same question posed now, the swing from
poverty issues to growth, trade and macroeconomic adjustment
issues would be glaring. To the first question, "Why give aid
in the 1970's?" the following would be a representative
answer:
"A minimum objective should be that the distortion in
income distribution within developing nations should at
least stop increasing by 1975 and begin to narrow within
the last half of the decade... the program to accomplish
this objective must be designed to attack the absolute
poverty which exists to a totally unacceptable degree in
almost all of our developing member countries... That
means in practice the elimination of malnutrition and
illiteracy, the reduction of infant mortality and the
raising of life expectancy standards to those of the
developed nations." (20)
To the second question, "Why give aid in the 1980's?", the
following is an answer now being given:
"....it has become clear that the developing
countries will be unable to recover from recession
and debt crisis and move back to the path of
development and growth without, among other things,
more efficient policy management and investment....
it is also obvious that economic and financial
difficulties in the developing countries will have
direct consequences on the economies of the
developed world..." (21)
20 Robert S. McNamara. "Speech to the Board of
Governors", Nairobi, Kenya (September 24, 1973).
21 A.W. Clausen, excerpt from speech delivered to the
opening session of the Conference on Urban Assistance in
Washington D.C., on December 2, 1985.
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Similarly, if the same test was applied specifically to
the context of aid for cities, again, the response from the
1970's would be remarkably different from a current answer. A
representative answer to: "Why give aid to cities?" asked in
1970 would be:
"The city throughout the developing world is in some
sense the sign and symbol of the development process...
In this development decade we must find cures for urban
unemployment, the shanty towns, hunger and
illiteracy.. .The progress of cities depends upon it."
(22)
and, in the 1980's:
"...the future economic growth of developing
countries depends critically on the smooth
functioning of cities... inefficient urban
management has macro-economic implications."(23)
Thus the overall international shift in interests which can
only be described as towards greater conservatism, sifts down
through all levels of the aid business, in this case to the
city level.
Another implicit shift, though perhaps obvious, should be
stated. As a result of this "big mood swing," the entire
22 United Nations Department of Economic and Social
Affairs, "Urbanization in the Second United Nations
Development Decade". (New York: United Nations, 1970).
23 The World Bank, "New Directions in Bank Urban
Projects," Urban Edge 9,3 (March 1983).
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grounds have shifted from giving aid for low-income housing as
a means of alleviating poverty to giving aid to cities in
order to alleviate inefficiencies and thereby promote national
economic growth. One senior Bank staff member stated the
case:
"If you have two cities, the first provided with
good infrastructure and the second with poor water,
sewerage and refuse collection services, and you
want to set up a business or locate an industry,
which city would you choose? In the poorly
serviced city you would have to provide your own
services which means less profits, and therefore,
less jobs and less productive cities. In this way,
urban must be seen as a sector of the national
economy... Economic growth is dependent on the
efficiency of the city."
It is the shifting grounds on why give aid for housing to
why give aid to cities which reflects this broader,
ideological swing in an organization like the World Bank. The
conflict between a previous concern with poverty alleviation
and the current mood of concern for urban efficiency and
economic growth also characterizes the demise of the sites and
services program at the Bank and the rise of the new urban
management lending strategy. These international swings thus
act to bring certain ideas into fashion and quicken the
decline of others.
(b) "Personality Changes"
The movement in ideas within the Bank I would also link
to personalities. Many ideas in fact owe their popularity to
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the personalities that support them. The role of Robert
McNamara as President of the World Bank has been well
documented (24) as a special character, exceptional to an
organization like the World Bank. His personal impressions of
development and concerns with poverty, while already becoming
a focus in the international development community, helped to
push the Bank during the 1970's into lending that might not
otherwise have occurred. For example, sites and services,
self-help, and squatter upgrading all became ideas in good
currency at the Bank, when Robert McNamara was delivering
speeches calling for the alleviation of poverty and stressing
the need for aid to reach the poor.
Within Urban, the role of personalities was also
significant in driving and fuelling ideas. For example, the
appointment of Edward Jaycox to head up the new Urban Projects
Department in 1972 in the McNamara years, played a key role in
the rise of sites and services at the Bank. In my discussions
with a number of former Urban projects staff, the early
pioneers of the Bank's sites and services projects who worked
under Edward Jaycox in this era, the terms they used to
describe him included: "a spark," "a real leader," "a man who
made us feel we had a mission," and "who created a real
mystique for our work in the Bank." The timing of the
departure of Edward Jaycox as Chief of the Urban Projects
24 Ayres, R.L.,Banking_oDthePoor, Cambridge: MIT
Press, 1983
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Department (he is now a Vice-President in the Bank) and Robert
McNamara as President of the World Bank is not coincidental to
this shift which followed in the early 1980's away from
poverty and low-cost shelter concerns respectively.
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7.0 THELIFEOFIDEASINDEVELOPMENT
7.1 Introduction
The preceding discussion has traced the rise and decline
of the sites and services approach to low-cost shelter in the
cities of the Third World. Within this discussion I have
attempted to show that this decline is based on a shift in
interest rather than any inherent weakness in the sites and
services approach itself.
In tracing the "life of an idea" at the World Bank, I
have attempted to demonstrate a pattern in which new ideas
such as sites and services are latched onto, promoted and then
abandoned at a great rate as a result of organizational
pressures to do so. I believe that organizational judgments
of the fate of these ideas often have more to do with the
dynamics of the internal workings of donor agencies than with
the substantive merits of an idea vis a vis the context of its
application in a developing area.
I have also observed that the current movement within the
World Bank towards urban management is logical in the sense
that it is emerging from the basis of sites and services
project experience. In this regard, I have argued that urban
management should be a complementary approach to sites and
services. However, this movement towards urban management is
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part of a larger trend within the Bank which is signalling a
concomitant abandonment of sites and services project lending,
and other poverty targetted lending.
Through the analysis of a specific sites and services
project I have shown that current criticisms of the projects
are valid but these problems are not insurmountable,
particularly if urban management lending by the Bank is
adopted as a complementary approach. In particular, the so-
called "failures" of sites and services were often a direct
result of conditions for the projects which the Bank set in
order to satisfy criteria internal to its operations (such as
the need for speed and to demonstrate a new approach), but
which were not inherent in the original sites and services
idea.
Moreover, I believe that the successes in sites and
services projects are impressive in their capacity to reach
poor people with low cost shelter solutions, but more
importantly, in broadening their opportunities for
development. I argue therefore that the current movement to
abandon sites and services lending is unwarranted.
I have argued that new urban management lending policy is
being promoted by the World Bank at the expense of sites and
services, although internally, a debate is still alive as to
the fate of sites and services. The damage of this "shift and
abandon" pattern I have estimated to be fourfold:
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1) just as shelter policies were beginning to tilt within
developing country governments toward a more equitable
provision of land and housing to the poor, the momentum is
being broken;
2) the depth of experience within developing country local
governments gained from the Bank's lending for sites and
services projects risks being marginalized if the policy is
abandoned, imposing high costs and lost opportunities;
3) similarly within the Bank, the Urban staff's decade of
experience within sites and services represents lost learning
within the organization; and
4) under the guise of technical fine-tuning, a more
fundamental policy shift is accomodated away from development
with equity towards urban productivity - a shift back to the
1950's trickle-down model - implying large social costs in the
cities of developing countries.
What should be a building of the sites and services
ex'perience in complement with the needed urban management
strategy is now being turned into an either-or struggle within
the World Bank. The debate of ideas is becoming the agent for
pushing deeper ideological positions, and the shift towards
urban management at the expense of sites and services is being
used to accomodate the more conservative swing being felt
internationally, away from issues of poverty towards
efficiency and growth. In this way, new ideas must be
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recognized as having inherent power that can be used in
opportunistic ways.
I believe that the Bank's new focus on urban management
without a reciprocal concentration on urban poverty targeted
projects is a step backwards in the interests of development.
Furthermore, this "shift and abandon" pattern is
symptomatic of a general malaise which I feel characterizes
the way policy is formulated and promoted in the development
assistance field.
The circumstances which drive this pattern are complex
and multiple. Some of these factors have been addressed in
the preceding chapter related to the specific sites and
services/urban management dynamic.
The implications for this pattern in the development
field in general are discussed in the following.
7.2 Characteristics of the Life of Ideas
While the organizational analysis in Chapter 6 partly
explained the Bank's need to shut the door on one idea and
move onto another, it did not seem to explain the larger trend
of a continuous cycle of ideas, of which sites and services
was an example, being latched onto and abandoned.
The characteristics of this trend are as follows:
(1) those (for example "projects people") most closely
related to making an idea work in practice, are more committed
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to persevering and develop loyalties to an idea whereas others
who are only attached to an idea at an abstract level (for
example, "policies people"), are more apt to abandon ideas
quickly and latch onto new ones;
(2) once a new idea begins to catch on, the negative
aspects of the preceding idea are distorted at the expense of
the "successes" which are lost sight of even by the most
faithful followers;
(3) evaluations of the preceding policy in this way
become ammunition to support the movement, albeit often
unwittingly, but at other times in a more overt, opportunistic
way;
(4) the rise and fall of ideas is dependent on issues of
timing and a convergence of events often guided by broader
ideological swings;
(5) at some moment in time, when the cumulative effect of
these events takes hold, a new idea (like urban management in
the Bank) gains an enormous momentum and is fueled by new
subscribers lured by the optimism a new idea carries;
(6) once this momentum begins, a new pressure arises
which allows little space or open mindedness for a
multiplicity of ideas, and "old" ideas begin to look more
problematic than they actually are. This I call a pressure
towards a "singularity of ideas;"
(7) this tendency to hammer away at one singular policy
often results in a re-emergence of another problem, often the
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same or some relation of the old one, or even a side effect of
the new approach so that policy must again shift and begin
hammering away at another spot on the system.
This is the case with the shift away from the sites and
services policy to urban management. Here the tendency was to
hammer away at urban shelter problems until the problems of
city administration raised their heads, then to abandon this
effort and shift over to an urban management policy and hammer
away, ignoring the shelter problems of the poor. The social
costs of now focusing solely on the inadequacies of public
administration can be predicted and policies will again have
to shift. Instead of pursuing such efforts in tandem, these
pressures cause a swing in attention and a subsequent
abandonment of the preceding effort. The movement is almost
relentless.
To bring this larger pattern back to a case in point, the
problem with the Bank's shift to a lending policy for urban
management, is not urban management itself. Rather, my
criticism is directed towards the way this new policy is
applied without consideration for a balanced strategy of urban
development.
Perhaps the previous decade of lending for poverty could
be said to be remiss in its avoidance of productive aspects in
a city's development, just as now, I argue that a singular
focus on urban management policy fails to address the
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importance of poverty alleviation as a critical factor in a
city's progress.
7.3 Reform andRetrenchment
It is here that I would propose that a need exists within
large organizations, including the World Bank, to maintain a
continuous movement into new directions, something akin to
"change for change's sake."
A parallel of this diagnosis can be found in Roberto
Unger's theory of a continuous cycle of reform and
retrenchment characteristic of policy choices within modern
institutions. He would describe the constant swings of policy
from one idea to another, not as a progressive evolution, but
as a movement between a small number of familiar options.(1)
The reasons for this pattern in the field of
international development assistance I would attribute to at
least two factors:
Firstly, the "optimism bias," (2) Gunnar Myrdal's theory of
policy formulation, describes how a new idea lives for five
years and is then abandoned. His explanation for this pattern
is the apparent need to maintain a constantly heightened level
of optimism, which enthusiasm for new ideas inspires. He
1 Roberto M. Unger, False Necessity, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1986).
2 Gunnar Myrdal, The ChallengeofWorldPoverty, (New
York: Pantheon, 1970).
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describes the international development assistance field as
one which requires this optimism as a means of maintaining
continued international support.
And secondly, career advancement within development
organizations (specifically because development is such an
uncertain path)! may be perceived as dependent upon
association with ideas that are, or understood to be, on the
"cutting edge." In other words, some Bank staff progress
through the hierarchy by associating themselves with a new
direction which, because it has not been tried, holds forth
the promise of a panacea.
7.4 Conclusion
In my criticism of this pattern of new ideas replacing
the old, I do not mean to suggest that the rapid proliferation
of ideas is in itself a negative occurrence. What I oppose is
the arbitrary abandonment of policies which remain sound.
In Third World development it is essential to maintain
some degree of continuity in the solutions being applied to
long-standing problems.
An issue of timing has been detected in this research
whereby the lifecycle of ideas within the donor agencies
appears to be out of synchronization with the recipient
governments movements in policy, and experience within a
slower moving development process. The application of a new
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idea in the donor agencies, although intended to assist this
development process in some way, takes on a life of its own
which becomes more a function of the donor organization's
internal pressures than the recipient's experience with that
idea. Hence the idea may go out of currency in the
international sphere, just as the recipient governments'
experience in testing this idea is beginning to show positive
results.
The main conclusion I draw from this analysis is that the
World Bank and other donors must aim for a continuity of
policy which is free from this relentless oscillation in the
life of ideas. The responsibility to do so belongs equally to
the governments of the developing world. A successful path of
development can only be followed by breaking out of this
eternal cycle of reform and retrenchment. Such an independent
path, I would argue, is a forward movement, as opposed to the
motions of one step forward, one back which I have tracked
here.
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APPENDIX A: NEWSPAPER ACCOUNTS OF NAIROBI CITY COUNCIL
PROBLEMS -ND RELATED PLOTMISLLOCTIONS IN THE
UMOJ_ HOUSING PROJECT
The following collection of newspaper clippings describe in
detail the problems being encountered in Nairobi City Council
during the execution of the Dandora and Umoja housing
projects. These articles describe the series of events
leading up to the dissolution of the Nairobi City Council by
the Government of Kenya, and the role that the misallocation
of sites and services plots by the City Councilors played in
the dissolution of the Council. This story is abbreviated in
the text of the study; the articles are included here as a
longer, more detailed account for those readers interested in
the story.
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directivis from the OPINION'
Ministry of. Local Govern-
Mrnintr to Locab ox ene above the Ministry's recommern- In many instances, recipients
. ded figures- Of contracts and tenders aban-and wasteful financia[ A great deal of the waste in doned their commitments.
policies are among the expenditure has Occurred in the sometimes even before undertak-
f causes, behind the area of tenders and contracts for ing them, and sometimes before
current financial Crisis goods, services and capital completing them.development projects. An The result is that the councilfacing the Nairobi CitY appraisal of. the situation has had to re-advertise,CounciL indicates that the Council's sometimes as many as three or
A scrutiy of -the councirs methods of processing tenderers four times, the same tenders and
budgets for the last two years and contractors are very poor and contracts- often at higher prices
shows that the Council has leave a lot to be desired. than, those envisaged in the
ignored the Ministry's directives sw til f ai:Te ndeis original contracts and tenders-
to limit what- is termed "con- ar awerded ufte The inefficiency of the Coun-
trollable expenditure''. ti. cis. tender gystem alone' has
In the 1970. budget,, for cue C sff caused the council to suffer huge
Instance, the M nistry; drecte?_ tosses running intoamiilions
the Counci to stick to figures ,and - -shilings. Ineffsioncfirt
adjusted by the -.Ministry in -i s.has also
respect of 35 items. In the second instance, it generated substantial losses that
The adjustment figures amoun- appears that the Council tends to have made their contribution to
ted to f729,650 compared to the be singu'arly inept in its standards the current financial crisis.
..ot-.. 2 original Jigures of of assessing the financial In April and May, 1973, several
E766,660. soundness ard competence of departments of the council
This would have saved the tenderers and contractors. engaged in piecew-eal job
council a sum of E37,010. Many recipients of council regrading exercises which would-
The council instead chose to tenders and contracts have failed, have swelled the council's payroll
finre--time adjuted guir according to council' minutes, to bill even Asore.
Instead spent a total of £804,973 iVe up to theii contractual obliga- The aeve by the Deatnts
or "e 35 i-tems - some t5,329 ns. of Heaftl% Education and Housing
and Socal, eevices w
eTrasurer, but be was overuled by 
-e
Goth ~ ~ 0. tr~te adiaceCm peated brs fohe os-both te S'tadf andf Finance ~ However, a recent trend on themittees. 
-'~
The City Treasurer was quoted Part of the senior officers of the Waggestio that tWe E20,00
os saying that "piecemea recom- council to equate their status and couid4if es fr th, people
;mendations on these issues terms of service and respors. Kariobag- evMatiare explod
would result in industrial unrest sibi-ties with the high-echelon WUat understand
ind. grave:- financia problems t. lQves. i, the Civil Service lb
- hich would a iertanly ad thethe
thr total. collapsoe o the -tand com ite. te nwr -
- A naa vigde0t than ever befori hieb
At a later stage; the om.jole as watchd F the
tees concerned and other chief '
;officers'"seemed to heed hii
and decid te ca in
aout Jobregid xeric
.costs of £68,000 was te be~
shared by the- councis andOthe
then Mombase Municipal Couaci g
A, The Inbucon report, which cost---
the councit'a cool E48,000, was
never implemented. a .pt _ tio tet he turna
Standing committees are y hae &vew hiisiecedas t the may
supposed to operate the council's- nb a.chi.f to 1aa the cosnci E20,000
akan-balance system, -mr * i
k epa close wnehe pr Iformeonaof. th -~ coni fies---m
Sut this particutae ircider't a eftre i sts4; e
3usa.e4e& Qh 4 iauwe fv heAore- The -V."'e'm.-e d6.1s1e11 <" C VinW
,nxta o e uo - these e. cameas, do sjst as eM e ae i0ie MRe oaemeed
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POLICE vesterday took away several files from
the City Hall and the County Hall on the second
day of a probc ordered by President Daniel arap
0-nifoirmed policemen guarded the offices of the
own Clerk, Deputy Town Clerk and -the Director of
Social Services and Housing as the files were being put
Ini t apoliceP caSvr4snr officers- wereals in-
Outside the oraices o1 depan-
mrental heads uniftirred
pi emen stopped the pubic
going inside A number
of council oficers and coun-
cilors a-:, puIc wee tomg
aim .sa arund the :-o-,er
tut 'Lr -ay f;o we mees
where te wrc vas g.'%rg
OM.
.- - .,, ~ ~ r -
terviewed.
.i.Fiery were awaN frm their
The C.I.D. probe team instituted to investigate allegations of
arrupat~ion 4 the City Couni~sealewff ehe Coimcipposed to con-
ueveuOfmice. The eam laundibed by the Attorney-General'M tne wo g hile the probe 
Iames Karugu and led by the Assistant Commissioner of Pohi te was caring t its
Mr. J. S. Solhi. started fs work on Monday after a group of 32 work. One officer said oe tid
touncIlirs ircluding the Nairobi Mayor. Na:han Kahara, had not know what departments
px the Town Cl-rx, Simon Geronea on charges of C would be involved in the exer-
sai I in:CRYI Hacise.faserhr Standh Another source at City Hall
en iitoay iac promc alleged the Eastlands Revenue
was investigating the af- A office had been sealed off for
.i of The Town Clerk's office investigations
owing a closed-door 1 On Friday, Mayor Nathan
meeting beiween the ghe Kahara called ~a special
. and the Mayor. i-eeting f Th  full Council
Proibed -e and tabled an agenda 'calling
h erksfffice, or the suspension of Mr.
Department Getonga. He accused him of
1 nu ti g eC e blocking major administrative
-ng d, i decisione, getting involved in a
khs. 2.2 million drug scandalj
failimg t give proper 4ad
raie o i*n
atW~idaI dki
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,Aine In addition'most of them
f9l r-818 SI %eo bycomh ctio have yet to pay their
ao Co4-GP ap mycomputer. but this appecrs depsits, depriving the con-
pears to hv e t 1ave been standeoned ir, ciI of the use of a qaaer of
caLted ah he case of the inner core mimion shillings.I los. The plots allocated to thej Ong-o ve r siaT Umnja- The all ns to mernbert councillors-are in category 'A'
ousing estate. SeveraV of the c-ane) snow that and are mostly in the
d~err~in  r th eir aPPIation forms are ir favoured Zone 3. Th e sale
tV S-enef numenrcal sequence, whereas price was Shs. 35.CX Wahvarety of numbers could deposits of 15 PC! cent
Om allocations for in- have been expected to appear (5.415) -or 25 per ce;A S3s.
er core plots, designed J! they had chanced their iuck 3.25).
or development by Ithe along with znerribers of the Tne newino 1r e4, .. to
wners.~mgth p-cz tc.btc zc~2 r
fcoh . pr wo-n the houJses qor the hme n
"63ocacion nm!bers of the who have already U.re
aete ethe top dt the It no" to ac)ha w
AAbo h is are ld Two lot a numb" co
at is said tt the Coirlbemone vut towards agreed to end ranom coma -
DrovZdin ac e puter allocations, even
Vr7 esi:te. the i ouj h there wiaecary
a; e, in rmrt case. r, d'an-e 40;0 on the ciys hcu&9
4 of the one martge house" wailing ltsL
principle
-Wtihe-exception of a
4- ~ andful of the people in-s
- oived, atlthe 'favoured
people already own their own
houses or rent hornes from
the Council.
Also breached was the rule
ormer mayor Ngumba.Jorbidding allocations to
-wice AU ,,cldren. designed to preve(4bamilies acquiring more than
one property.it was a!so envisaged h-at
ople allocated plots yo:.AdUN~ealoglar upythe personly os a
$.ast ive year cnditionjihost of the POWle orf the fis
stood to ' sed. -
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t App. No Name A218 006378 K. Kirdo - coun Aru
48 000076 Charles KoTira- A173 006379 G. N. Ngari B123 006419 K. Kimondo.A252 006380 0. G. Manyara - coun. A251 006420 J. 0. Mutere.2 000.91 J. Gtau KMyanui A253 006381 M. Mutun - coun. A143 006421 C. Kagunda - star>000368 Nathan Muth A138 0063E3 D. A. Cdachi - coun A142 006422 Z. W. Maira (Mis
1,V4 0006440 Hnr Thur"b D - A256 006385 K. Mbuthia - coun. A264 006424 S. Karimi - staf.162 007644 C.seruinb De~ A136 006386 P. W. Mathenge - coun. A262 006427 J. M. Njora - coun.162 00715 C.V. Weru.Al60037Gk CaisA60047J 
.No a -cou.150 001-754 Aloysius Gonza Otundo A164 006387 Goko- Charies A135 006428 S. K. Munyao cour.
159 001800 Susan A- Kabiru -staff A139 006388 S. Waite - coun. A261 006429 Mr. and Mrs. Kubu
146 00100 Jason Kiamba Kimbui A134 006389 F. R Ndwaru - coun. B177 006430 B. A. Gathuna'- coun.100180 Ji A132 006390 J. K. Nyoike -- coun. A133 006431 D. N. Kamau - coun.
147 01 Ista - A130 006391 0. Amber -- coun. A131 006432 S. Wanjohi - coun.1 001806 Bernard Kathanga. A141 006392 M. Ndegwa - staff. A260 006433 A. Wamwea - P.C.'sAll 002016 Cyrus Warbugu. A258 006393 Moses Nganga. office Nrb.
C40 002713 Esther Wanjiku A171 006394 K. Mwaganu coun A54 006434 K. Kabutu - coun.
145 002789 Reuben Wanjih. A52 006395 J 0..O. Fuaya- coun- A53 006435 J. Musyimi coun.7 reeA54 006396 J Ngethe coun. A163 006436 G. G. Kabaki
61 005465 Wambi K. NgA51 006397 J. M. Kuria courL A259 006437 Alex C. Kangethe -
if 006103 Maenieleo Gro A49 006398 A. M. Chu - coun- deputy P.C. Nrb.
55 -06110 Macharia saac A45 006399 J. K. Njogu - cour' B122 006438 G. K. Mutura - coun.00640q J0.1 acaj [saac-<oim
A152 006237 Arthur GacheruA43 00640J. K. Njigua - coun- B118 006439 J. Z. Ochino - cc n. B120 006401 Z. W. Ndururu - un- A166 006440 Josphat Waithak aA24 006-367 A. K_ Ngumnba -formner I. AN0060 ay jr .I .- I: t- A160 006403 Mary Njeni J, ounim .A255 006408 A. K. Nguroba - forr19 006368 G. K. Kinima -coun. and A4 0044 P.Bi -. con and.re deput - - -ar~ fome . (Y 64 1 ., ait un. 
former deputy rnayor-ma forrner Nrb. P.C
1 006370 G. Nganga - courn A68 006410 N. Kahara - mayor A137 006442 F. M. Mbogori - coun.
A156 006371 Agnes Njeri - A106 006411 G. Ngariga - cour A165 006443 H. Wanjiru
A250 006372 0. Okong'o - coun. A248 006412 M. Muoo - coun. 8119 0C444 W. N. Midamba - coun
-A247 005374 E. J. Miuriuki - coun. A157 006413 Zokoyo M. Mbijire. 8121 00645 K. Njuna - coun.
A265 006375 J. W. Macua - coun. A264 006414 J. M. Wangoru- coun. A42 006446 J. M. Muratha.
255 006376 . R B.- Apudo -camti : .A105 006415 G: Nganga. A266 006447 G. E. Wanjau -r-coun.
4n0063T LMaina -:coun and A174 006416 GitheW PouL . A257 006448 Cyrus Gitonga Muhcya
rm p m158 004Z..uidy e . Alas 006633 John Karemeri Nganga.
P-U "4[~~ IS-~-
of affttie of City Pa 0poi
medium and low grade empi
irobr City Council:
I 7en Ngumba Kimani -
ayor
n u - fg
men #effUrtfa*MDeve'
for Starelle.ne
Mbau LCity Engiiee
Wanyoike -- Ambassador to
ima - Former Deputy Ma
a 9 - , WebK
s meant."--- Water. 3. Mungai - Senior staff-
dyees f Coun. K. Mbuthia. Coun. Margaret Mugo.B. W. Nyagah - Assistant City Engineer. jcoun. Mwangi Chui.
B. W. Gituiku - Deputy Director of Cour K.. Kimondo - Chairman, Umoja
former Housing and Social Services. -- IHousing DevelopmentProject.S. W. Nyagah - Assistant City
fic-bo Engineer. .Miss lkua -District Officer, Nairobi.Coun. Midamba .. t3;,. Coun. Waithaka Macharia. '
F.H K. Muchene - AssiStant Ci tY. <JXMaina Wanjigi-- Former Assistant
me .Education OfficerL. A - Minister for- Edcation and MP for
Coun. Mugo Muratha. Kamukung.
E. M. Kiongo - Staff Dr. Z. Njigua.
S Wdenv. J. S. Muriu - Commercial Bank of S. M. Rionge - Senior staff.
yor Africa. X. M. Kenyatta.(later-former Assistant
plaiii J.-K. Mbaca- CommerciaL Bank of.: e Kf reg d.MP for
sm Africa ij 
GJ.Namue City -Counc:i staf f
Coun. D Manyar 'P K.Bol- Forer Nirobi PC,
Karuga (Tatama- Deputy' City; k K. Icharia -Senior staff.
Treasurer. A totat of 17 plots were allocated later,
Co. .,,-rmaina Gachugue. Deputy City and among the later beneficiaries were:
EdbcationOfer.a*m Lee- Mwn hoorereumer.Mneert Mwgt: -%0 .6 iA WSncs On LCiL; -:
Francist.Thuo-- Forme Chairman,
Nafb tock Eidbgng
Of fibiarorett
(rIC Gakur -Senior- staf CM~fesDgorett
PM Gathun - Senior staf S atr Nationat
uperin- S. J. Kuria - Senior staff. DusinGCbrdarition and tioIS MP for
W oire: avr Pormer MP for
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VVOUKR CCASSIC reportis ii Yi
tvelation of the City 1Hail allo ation of
poja:building plots, which you lerm
e inner core jist is flabbergasting,
nd an indication of the type of greedy
eaders we have in our country§Hence
e befitting title for the controversy'as
reported in your Sunday Standard of
June &
A look at the "Inner Core Lis shows in no
6ncertain Aerms how 4he ,aid down procedu
vofrplia all caion of lie iy '1idnts w4
broken(tt was a dirty exercise which resulted in
ouncillors of the time. our present wonderful
mayor included being alncated i plot in coajlete disregard of the gerwine applicants wbo
-%ave Tor a long time hoped against hope~ toowa
even a quarter of what the councillors presentl
The pasi regime at City Hall seems to have
operated in suspicious circumstances and no
doubt lhere is more to be revealeI by -e
current oe
; Some Nairobi councillors broke the . very
.- w that brought them 91h b al tiz~I
Sots Tr their children: we
and relatives a move (hat
has resiobed in widening the
.;ng 'ap be;vtrn the
e anid the have nots.
The time has come, as
home of our MPs say, when
vwe should declar the weight
our wealth and 'how we
w itab suffegrm
s, latd entrusted
the du*'es Fnrve'lf
-0 the Ebocking revelations
it the Nairobi City Hall are
aniything to go by, then I
suggest that similar Karugu-
led probes- should be made
into institutions of this kind
be carried out al over the
C(Y. ntrv..
I further request a tl
Sification of the repried
its of the Umioja pLos
4lccations : and that
allocation of those plots be
dore again. under the super-
vision of he Any
C neral and Oih t , 1e of
ther interested p' es
\ While corruption can be
referred to as the most in-
fallible symptom or cn-
stitutional libery, we should
sacrifice every drop o1 our
b~c.,d to stamp it, Cut, fli: it
-1
scapegoat for fa: M-
-herever it is ranpant
& ALEVNrLTER ONSOTI
' NOKUA,
NairubL
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APPENDIX B: WORLD BANK ORGANIZATION CHART
The so-rce for the organization chart below is reprinted
here in part from the "World Bank Organization Chart-
October, 1985." This chart details only the "Operations"
Department of the World Bank under the Senior Vice President-
Mr. Ernest Stern. Ex-cluded from this chart are the other
departments of the Bank uLnder the Vice Presidents of:
Finance; Economics and Research; Personnel and
Administration; External Relations; and, the Vice President
a.tnd General Counsel and Vice President and Secretary. As of
this writinq the Bark is underqcing another reorganization.
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APFENDIXC: TECHNICALAFEENDIX
The information from this study is drawn from three
principal sources: one based on field observations of sites
and services projects during one year of residency in Nairobi,
Kenya; another on interviews with staff of the World Bank and
USAID; and, finally, from an in depth review of official
project documents and evaluations.
With regard to the first, field observation of the World
Bank assisted Dandora project and the USAID assisted Umoja I
sites and services projects in Nairobi occurred during 1983
and 1984 when both projects were just being completed. At
that time, the World Bank assisted Kayole project was underway
and USAID was assisting the government in preparation of Umoja
II.
Site visits, interviews with the housing staff and community
development officers of the Nairobi Housing Development
Department, and interviews with the staff of the Housing
Research and Development Unit at the University of Nairobi
were conducted. Informal questioning of a small number of
households in each of the Dandora and Umoja housing estates
was undertaken, although this study does not draw on such
information in any direct sense. Friends living in these
sites and services projects afforded opportunities for
frequent visits and to watch the building up of these plots
over the year, and to hear stories of their neighbors'
activities.
Interviews with a Catholic priest living in the Dandora
project and the Community Development Officers of HDD provided
much of the information included in this study on the local
efforts to overcome the problems of the poorest allottees, in
coping with the Dandora project in the early stages. From
these interviews I learned of the creation of the Welfare
Revolving Fund and of the Ford Foundation grant to assist
these poorest households in getting their first room built
(for sublet so as to avoid eviction for arrears.) In
addition, from this group I received a copy of a new survey of
Dandora households which had just been completed and was as
yet unpublished. The quality of the data was somewhat rough
as it was not yet processed, and hence it is only used
sparingly in this study. The survey was conducted by George
MacInnes, a priest who had lived in Dandora. The data is
cited in this study as well as in the World Bank's audit of
the Dandora project.
The second principal source of information for this study is
drawn from interviews that were conducted with satff of the
World Bank in Washington. Interviews were also conducted with
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USAID staff in both the East and Southern Africa Regional
Housing and Urban Development Office (RHUDO) and the USAID
headquarters in Washington. The majority of the interviews
were with the World Bank staff who had worked on sites and
services projects, Dandora as well as many of the other
projects worldwide. Some 30 interviews were conducted in
total, with staff who once were, or remain to be, part of the
Urban staff at the Bank. The staff interviewed all had some
early affiliation with sites and services projects, many in
fact had pioneered the idea in the early 1970's. Most of
these "pioneers," at the time of interviewing, were occupying
senior posts at the World Bank, including projects division
chiefs, country programs division chiefs, regional directors
and vice presidents. The staff interviewed were from a good
cross-section of the Bank and were representative of the six
regional divisions; both policy and project staff; and,
varying levels of seniority.
Finally, an in-depth review of official project documents
has been undertaken along with official project evaluations,
audits and urban sector review papers. Although the Dandora
case is the central focus of this study, 16 sites and services
project cases in total were examined for this study. These
include: Zambia, 1974; Kenya I, 1974; Kenya II, 1978;
Nicaragua,1973; Guatamala, 1976; Botswana, 1974; Bolivia,
1977; Tanzania, 1974; Zimbabwe, 1984; Korea,1974; Senegal,
1972; Peru, 1974; El Salvador, 1974; Nigeria, 1981;
Indonesia, 1974; and, Jamaica, 1973.
From this wide review of sites and services projects, it was
discovered that similar project outcomes to those witnessed in
Nairobi were experienced in not only other African projects,
but in the Latin American and Asian cases as well. For
example, project delays in the provision of services were
experienced in Lusaka, El Salvador and Philippines for similar
reasons found in the Nairobi case. Cost overruns resulted but
affordability was maintained in each through methods similar
to those employed in Nairobi. Most of the Bank's projects
examined were affordable to households below median income and
often did reach down to the 20th income percentile as
targetted. This review of project documents, Bank files and
project evaluations has indicated that the Dandora project is
a representative case of the World Bank's sites and services
work.
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